

## BP-16 Initial Rate Proposal

# Power Risk and Market Price Study

BP-16-E-BPA-04

December 2014





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## COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND SHORT FORMS

AAC	Anticipated Accumulation of Cash
ACNR	Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue
AER step	Actual Energy Regulation study
AGC	Automatic Generation Control
ALF	Agency Load Forecast (computer model)
aMW	average megawatt(s)
AMNR	Accumulated Modified Net Revenues
ANR	Accumulated Net Revenues
AOP	Assured Operating Plan
ASC	Average System Cost
BAA	Balancing Authority Area
BiOp	Biological Opinion
BPA	Bonneville Power Administration
BPA-P	Bonneville Power Administration – Power
BPA-T	Bonneville Power Administration – Transmission
Btu	British thermal unit
CDD	cooling degree day(s)
CDQ	Contract Demand Quantity
CGS	Columbia Generating Station
CHWM	Contract High Water Mark
CNR	Calibrated Net Revenue
COE, Corps, or USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commission	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Corps, COE, or USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COSA	Cost of Service Analysis
COU	consumer-owned utility
Council or NPCC	Northwest Power and Conservation Council
CP	Coincidental Peak
CRAC	Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause
CSP	Customer System Peak
CT	combustion turbine
CY	calendar year (January through December)
DDC	Dividend Distribution Clause
<i>dec</i>	decrease, decrement, or decremental
DERBS	Dispatchable Energy Resource Balancing Service
DFS	Diurnal Flattening Service
DOE	Department of Energy
DOP	Detailed Operating Plan
DSI	direct-service industrial customer or direct-service industry
DSO	Dispatcher Standing Order
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EN	Energy Northwest, Inc.
EPP	Environmentally Preferred Power
ESA	Endangered Species Act

ESS	Energy Shaping Service
e-Tag	electronic interchange transaction information
FBS	Federal base system
FCRPS	Federal Columbia River Power System
FCRTS	Federal Columbia River Transmission System
FELCC	firm energy load carrying capability
FHFO	Funds Held for Others
FORS	Forced Outage Reserve Service
FPS	Firm Power and Surplus Products and Services (rate)
FY	fiscal year (October through September)
G&A	general & administrative
GARD	Generation and Reserves Dispatch (computer model)
GEP	Green Energy Premium
GMS	Generation Management Service
GRSPs	General Rate Schedule Provisions
GTA	General Transfer Agreement
GWh	gigawatthour
HDD	heating degree day(s)
HLH	Heavy Load Hour(s)
HOSS	Hourly Operating and Scheduling Simulator (computer model)
HYDSIM	Hydrosystem Simulator (computer model)
ICE	Intercontinental Exchange
<i>inc</i>	increase, increment, or incremental
IOU	investor-owned utility
IP	Industrial Firm Power (rate)
IPR	Integrated Program Review
IRD	Irrigation Rate Discount
IRM	Irrigation Rate Mitigation
IRMP	Irrigation Rate Mitigation Product
JOE	Joint Operating Entity
kcfs	thousand cubic feet per second
kW	kilowatt (1000 watts)
kWh	kilowatthour
LPP	Large Project Program
LDD	Low Density Discount
LLH	Light Load Hour(s)
LPTAC	Large Project Targeted Adjustment Charge
LRA	Load Reduction Agreement
Maf	million acre-feet
Mid-C	Mid-Columbia
MMBtu	million British thermal units
MNR	Modified Net Revenues
MRNR	Minimum Required Net Revenue
MW	megawatt (1 million watts)
MWh	megawatthour
NCP	Non-Coincidental Peak

NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NFB	National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) Biological Opinion (BiOp)
NLSL	New Large Single Load
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA Fisheries	National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries
NORM	Non-Operating Risk Model (computer model)
Northwest Power Act	Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
NPCC or Council	Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council
NPV	net present value
NR	New Resource Firm Power (rate)
NRFS	New Resource Flattening Service
NT	Network Transmission
NTSA	Non-Treaty Storage Agreement
NUG	non-utility generation
NWPP	Northwest Power Pool
OATT	Open Access Transmission Tariff
O&M	operation and maintenance
OATI	Open Access Technology International, Inc.
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPER step	operational study
OY	operating year (August through July)
PF	Priority Firm Power (rate)
PFp	Priority Firm Public (rate)
PFx	Priority Firm Exchange (rate)
PNCA	Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement
PNRR	Planned Net Revenues for Risk
PNW	Pacific Northwest
POD	Point of Delivery
POI	Point of Integration or Point of Interconnection
POM	Point of Metering
POR	Point of Receipt
Project Act	Bonneville Project Act
PRS	Power Rates Study
PS	BPA Power Services
PSW	Pacific Southwest
PTP	Point to Point Transmission (rate)
PUD	public or people's utility district
RAM	Rate Analysis Model (computer model)
RAS	Remedial Action Scheme
RD	Regional Dialogue
REC	Renewable Energy Certificate
Reclamation or USBR	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
REP	Residential Exchange Program

RevSim	Revenue Simulation Model (component of RiskMod)
RFA	Revenue Forecast Application (database)
RHWM	Rate Period High Water Mark
RiskMod	Risk Analysis Model (computer model)
RiskSim	Risk Simulation Model (component of RiskMod)
ROD	Record of Decision
RPSA	Residential Purchase and Sale Agreement
RR	Resource Replacement (rate)
RRS	Resource Remarketing Service
RSS	Resource Support Services
RT1SC	RHWM Tier 1 System Capability
RTO	Regional Transmission Operator
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCS	Secondary Crediting Service
Slice	Slice of the System (product)
T1SFCO	Tier 1 System Firm Critical Output
TCMS	Transmission Curtailment Management Service
TOCA	Tier 1 Cost Allocator
TPP	Treasury Payment Probability
TRAM	Transmission Risk Analysis Model
Transmission System Act	Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act
Treaty	Columbia River Treaty
TRL	Total Retail Load
TRM	Tiered Rate Methodology
TS	BPA Transmission Services
TSS	Transmission Scheduling Service
UAI	Unauthorized Increase
ULS	Unanticipated Load Service
USACE, Corps, or COE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USBR or Reclamation	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
VERBS	Variable Energy Resources Balancing Service (rate)
VOR	Value of Reserves
VR1-2014	First Vintage rate of the BP-14 rate period
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council (formerly WSCC)
WIT	Wind Integration Team
WSPP	Western Systems Power Pool

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA) business environment is replete with uncertainty that a rigorous ratesetting process must consider. The objective of the risk study is to identify, model, and analyze the impacts that key risks and risk mitigation tools have on Power Services' (PS) net revenue (total revenue less total expenses) and cash flow. The risk study is meant to ensure that power rates are set high enough that the probability BPA can meet its cash obligations is at least as high as required by BPA's Treasury Payment Probability (TPP) standard. This evaluation is carried out in two distinct steps: a risk assessment step, in which the distributions, or profiles, of operating and non-operating risks are defined, and a risk mitigation step, in which risk mitigation tools are assessed with respect to their ability to recover power costs given these uncertainties. The risk assessment estimates both the central tendency of risks and the potential variability of those risks. Both of these elements are used in the ratemaking process.

In this study the words "risk" and "uncertainty" are used in similar ways. Generally, each can have both up-side and down-side possibilities, that is, both beneficial and harmful impacts on BPA objectives. The BPA objectives that may be affected by the risks considered in this study are generally BPA's financial objectives.

### 1.1 Purpose of the Power Risk and Market Price Study

The Power Risk and Market Price Study (Study) characterizes the market price and PS net revenue distributions and demonstrates that the rates and risk mitigation tools together meet BPA's standard for financial risk tolerance, the TPP standard. This Study includes BPA's natural gas price forecast, electricity market price forecast, quantitative and qualitative analysis

1 of risks to PS net revenue, and tools for mitigating those risks. It also establishes the adequacy  
2 of those tools for meeting BPA's TPP standard.

### 3 4 **1.1.1 BPA's Treasury Payment Probability Standard**

5 In the WP-93 rate proceeding, BPA adopted and implemented its 10-Year Financial Plan, which  
6 included a policy requiring that BPA set rates to achieve a high probability of meeting its  
7 payment obligations to the U.S. Treasury (Treasury). *See* 1993 Final Rate Proposal  
8 Administrator's Record of Decision (ROD), WP-93-A-02, at 72. The specific standard set in the  
9 10-Year Financial Plan was a 95 percent probability of making both of the annual Treasury  
10 payments in the two-year rate period on time and in full. This TPP standard was established as a  
11 rate period standard; that is, it focuses upon the probability that BPA can successfully make all  
12 of its payments to Treasury over the entire rate period, not the probability for a single year. The  
13 10-Year Financial Plan was updated July 31, 2008, and renamed the "Financial Plan." *See*  
14 <http://www.bpa.gov/Finance/FinancialInformation/FinancialPlan/Pages/default.aspx>.

15  
16 The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act)  
17 states that BPA's payments to Treasury are the lowest priority for revenue application, meaning  
18 that payments to Treasury are the first to be missed if financial reserves are insufficient to pay all  
19 bills on time. 16 U.S.C. § 839e (a)(2)(A). Therefore, TPP is a prospective measure of BPA's  
20 overall ability to meet its financial obligations.

21  
22 BPA's Treasury payments are an obligation of the Agency. Since 2002, TPP has been  
23 independently measured for the Power Services (PS) and Transmission business lines. This  
24 Study tests the ability of PS to make its portion of the Treasury payments over the rate period.

1 The following items (explained in more detail in section 3 below) are included in the calculation  
2 of TPP:

- 3 (1) *Starting PS Reserves (Starting Financial Reserves Available for Risk Attributed*  
4 *to PS)*. Financial reserves comprise cash and investment instruments held in the  
5 Bonneville Fund, and the deferred borrowing balance. Financial reserves  
6 available for risk do not include funds held for others. For example, amounts in  
7 the Bonneville Fund that were provided by customers as collateral for credit  
8 worthiness are excluded. Deferred borrowing amounts exist when planned  
9 borrowing has not yet been completed. When the borrowing is completed, cash in  
10 the Bonneville Fund is increased and the deferred borrowing balance is reduced  
11 by the same amount, leaving financial reserves unchanged.
- 12 (2) *Planned Net Revenues for Risk*. PNRR is the final component of the revenue  
13 requirement that may be added to annual expenses. PNRR is needed only when  
14 the risk mitigation provided by starting financial reserves and other risk  
15 mitigation tools is not sufficient to meet the TPP standard.
- 16 (3) *BPA's Treasury Facility*. The Treasury Facility is an arrangement BPA has with  
17 the U.S. Treasury, allowing BPA to borrow up to \$750 million on a short-term  
18 basis. The full \$750 million in the Treasury Facility is considered to be available  
19 for the liquidity needs associated with PS. The Treasury Facility functions  
20 similarly to additional financial reserves.
- 21 (4) *Within-year Liquidity Need*. The within-year liquidity need is an amount of cash  
22 or short-term borrowing capability that must be set aside for meeting within-year  
23 liquidity needs (or risks). The PS within-year liquidity need for BP-16 is  
24 \$320 million. This assumption remains unchanged from BP-14 rates.

- 1 (5) *Liquidity Reserves Level.* The liquidity reserves level is the amount of PS  
2 Reserves that is allocated for meeting the within-year liquidity need. For this  
3 Study, the liquidity reserves level is \$0.
- 4 (6) *Liquidity Borrowing Level.* The liquidity borrowing level is the amount of the  
5 Treasury Facility set aside to meet the within-year liquidity need. For this Study,  
6 the liquidity borrowing level is \$320 million. This leaves \$430 million of the  
7 \$750 million Treasury Facility available for year-to-year liquidity needs  
8 (*i.e.*, TPP needs).
- 9 (7) *Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause.* The CRAC is an upward adjustment to  
10 applicable power and transmission rates. The adjustment is applied to rates  
11 charged for service beginning in October following a fiscal year in which PS  
12 Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue (ACNR) falls below the CRAC threshold.  
13 The threshold is set at the ACNR equivalent of \$0 in financial reserves available  
14 for risk attributed to PS. *See* Power Rate Schedules, BP-16-E-BPA-09,  
15 GRSP II.C.
- 16 (8) *Dividend Distribution Clause.* The DDC is a downward adjustment to the  
17 applicable power and transmission rates. The adjustment is applied to rates  
18 charged for service beginning in October following a fiscal year in which ACNR  
19 is above the DDC threshold. The threshold is set at the ACNR equivalent of  
20 \$750 million in financial reserves available for risk attributed to PS. *Id.* at  
21 GRSP II.E.

### 22 23 **1.1.2 How Risk and Market Price Results Are Used**

24 The main result from the risk assessment and mitigation process is the TPP calculation. If this  
25 number is 95 percent or higher, then the rates and risk mitigation tools meet BPA's TPP



1 standard. The calculations also take into account the thresholds and caps for the CRAC and the  
2 DDC. These values are incorporated in the GRSPs and will be applied in later calculations  
3 outside the ratesetting process for determining whether a CRAC or DDC will be applied to  
4 certain power and transmission rates for FY 2016 or FY 2017.

5  
6 Forecasts of electricity market prices are used in the Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01, for:

- 7 (a) Prices for secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases
- 8 (b) Prices for augmentation purchases
- 9 (c) Load Shaping rates
- 10 (d) Load Shaping True-up rate
- 11 (e) Resource Shaping rates
- 12 (f) Resource Support Services (RSS) rates
- 13 (g) Shaping the Demand rates used for the Priority Firm Power (PF), Industrial Firm  
14 Power (IP), and New Resources (NR) rate schedules
- 15 (h) PF Tier 2 Balancing Credit
- 16 (i) PF Unused Rate Period High Water Mark (RHWM) Credit
- 17 (j) Scaling PF Tier 1 Equivalent rates
- 18 (k) Scaling PF Melded rates
- 19 (l) Balancing Augmentation Credit
- 20 (m) Scaling IP energy rates
- 21 (n) Scaling NR energy rates
- 22 (o) Energy Shaping Service of the New Large Single Load (NLSL) True-Up rate

1 **1.2 Overview of Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

2 The risk study uses a set of models, shown in Figure 1. These models are further described  
3 throughout the course of the Study.

4  
5 **1.2.1 Risk Mitigation Objectives**

6 The following policy objectives guide the development of the risk mitigation package:

- 7 (a) Create a rate design and risk mitigation package that meets BPA financial  
8 standards, particularly achieving a 95 percent two-year Treasury Payment  
9 Probability.
- 10 (b) Produce the lowest possible rates, consistent with sound business principles and  
11 statutory obligations, including BPA’s long-term responsibility to invest in and  
12 maintain the aging infrastructure of the Federal Columbia River Power System  
13 (FCRPS).
- 14 (c) Set lower, but adjustable, effective rates rather than higher, more stable rates.
- 15 (d) Include in the risk mitigation package only those elements that can be relied upon.
- 16 (e) Do not let financial reserve levels build up to unnecessarily high levels.
- 17 (f) Allocate costs and risks of products to the rates for those products to the fullest  
18 extent possible; in particular, prevent any risks arising from Tier 2 service from  
19 imposing costs on Tier 1 or requiring stronger Tier 1 risk mitigation.
- 20 (g) Rely prudently on liquidity tools, and create means to replenish them when they  
21 are used in order to maintain long-term availability.

22  
23 These objectives are not completely independent and may sometimes conflict with each other.

24 Thus, BPA must create a balance among these objectives when developing its overall risk  
25 mitigation strategy.

## 1.2.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This Study distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative perspectives of risk. The quantitative risk assessment is a set of quantitative risk simulations that are modeled using a Monte Carlo approach, a statistical technique in which deterministic analysis is performed on a distribution of inputs, resulting in a distribution of outputs suitable for analysis. The output from the quantitative risk assessment is a set of 3,200 possible financial results (net revenues) for each of the two years in the rate period (fiscal years (FY) 2016–2017) and for the year preceding the rate period (FY 2015). The models used in the quantitative risk assessment are described in section 2 of this Study.

The 3,200 games from the quantitative risk assessment are used in the quantitative risk mitigation step to determine if BPA’s financial risk standard, the 95 percent TPP standard, has been met. The model used for the quantitative risk mitigation step is described in section 3 of this Study.

Some financial risks are unsuitable for quantitative modeling but are significant enough that they need to be accounted for. These risks usually fit into one of two general categories that make them unsuitable for modeling. The first type is risks for which there is no basis for estimating the probabilities of future outcomes; relevant historical data is unavailable and subject matter experts are unable to provide estimates of probabilities. The second type is risks for which modeling may adversely influence the future actions of human beings, including possible impact on legal proceedings.

The qualitative risk assessment and mitigation address these risks. For the most part, the qualitative risk assessment is a logical assessment of possible events that could have significant financial consequences for BPA. The qualitative risk mitigation describes measures BPA has put

1 in place, or responses BPA would make to these events, and then presents logical analyses of  
2 whether any significant residual financial risk remains for BPA after taking into account the  
3 mitigation measures. The qualitative risk assessment is described in section 4 of this Study.

4  
5 These analyses work together so that BPA develops rates that recover all of its costs and  
6 provides a high probability of making its Treasury payments on time and in full during the rate  
7 period.

#### 8 9 **1.2.2.1 Overview of Quantitative Risk Assessment**

10 The quantitative risk assessment is performed using models that quantify uncertainty. There is  
11 uncertainty in market prices, reflecting the uncertainty inherent in the fundamental drivers;  
12 *e.g.*, the natural gas price. There is uncertainty in the amount of surplus power that BPA will  
13 have available for secondary energy sales. There is uncertainty in the costs faced by BPA  
14 beyond expenses related to operation of the system; *e.g.*, fish and wildlife-related expenses.  
15 These uncertainties affect PS net revenue.

16  
17 Projections of market prices for electricity are used for many aspects of setting power rates,  
18 including the quantitative analysis of risk, presented in section 2 of the Study. This Study  
19 explains the data used for constructing the probabilistic market price forecast and how those data  
20 are used in generating the PS net revenue forecast.

#### 21 22 **1.2.2.2 Overview of Quantitative Risk Mitigation**

23 BPA's primary tool for managing the financial risks it faces is financial reserves. Since the  
24 WP-02 rate proceeding, BPA has included in its rate proposals cost recovery adjustment clauses  
25 that can adjust power rates between rate proceedings. These clauses add additional risk

1 mitigation to that provided by financial reserves and liquidity. In this rate proceeding, the  
2 CRAC, DDC, and National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Columbia River Power System,  
3 Biological Opinion (NFB) Mechanisms will apply to certain power rates as well as certain  
4 transmission rates for Ancillary and Control Area Services. When financial reserves available  
5 for risk plus the additional revenue earned through the CRAC do not provide sufficient risk  
6 mitigation to meet the 95 percent TPP standard, PNRR is added to the revenue requirement.  
7 This increases power rates, which generates additional reserves. This Study documents the risk  
8 mitigation package included in the BP-16 power rates. See section 1.2.1 above for a discussion  
9 of the main policy objectives considered when developing this risk mitigation package.

### 11 **1.2.2.3 Overview of Qualitative Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

12 Financial uncertainty that is not quantitatively modeled, and any mitigation measures for these  
13 risks, are described in section 4 of this Study. There are three primary categories of qualitative  
14 risks in this Study: risks associated with FCRPS Biological Opinions; risks associated with  
15 Tier 2 rate design; and risks associated with Resource Support Services. Biological Opinion  
16 risks are mitigated through the NFB Mechanisms described in this Study and GRSP ILN.

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1 **2. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT**

2 **2.1 Introduction**

3 This section describes the uncertainties pertaining to Power Services, and hence BPA’s financial  
4 risk in the context of setting power rates. Section 3 describes how BPA determines whether its  
5 risk mitigation measures are sufficient to meet the TPP standard given the risks detailed in this  
6 section.

7  
8 Variability in PS net revenue, a product of uncertainty in both power generation and market  
9 prices, is substantial. BPA also considers uncertainty in (1) customer load; (2) Columbia  
10 Generating Station (CGS) output; (3) wind generation; (4) system augmentation costs;  
11 (5) PS transmission and ancillary services expenses; and (6) 4(h)(10)(C) credits. The effects  
12 of these risk factors on PS net revenue are quantified in this Study.

13  
14 PS also faces risks not directly related to the operation of the power system. These non-  
15 operating risks are modeled in the Non-Operating Risk Model (NORM). These risks include the  
16 potential for CGS, Corps of Engineers (USACE), and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)  
17 operations and maintenance (O&M) spending to differ from their forecasts. NORM also  
18 accounts for variability in interest rate expense. NORM models variability in net revenues,  
19 including uncertainty in the length of the CGS refueling outages in FY 2015 and FY 2017.

20  
21 **2.2 Study Models**

22 BPA traditionally models risks using Monte Carlo simulation. Accordingly, AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>,  
23 RevSim, NORM, and ToolKit each run 3,200 iterations, or games. AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> estimates  
24 electricity prices, which serve as inputs to numerous other studies, including this Study. RevSim  
25 (*see* section 2.2.3.2 below) combines Federal system generation with prices from  
26 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>, as well as 4(h)(10)(c) credits and other revenues and expenses, to produce

1 3,200 values for net revenue. The output of this process is combined with the distribution of  
2 output from NORM and provided to ToolKit, which calculates TPP. If TPP is below the  
3 95 percent standard required by BPA's 10-Year Financial Plan, then one of several risk  
4 mitigation tools may be adjusted until the standard is met. These options include (1) raising the  
5 CRAC threshold, which makes it more likely that the CRAC will trigger; (2) increasing the cap  
6 on the annual revenue the CRAC can collect; and/or (3) adding PNRR to the revenue  
7 requirement.

### 9 **2.2.1 @RISK® Computer Software**

10 NORM is maintained in Microsoft Excel® with the add-in risk simulation computer package  
11 @RISK®, a product of Palisade Corporation, Ithaca, NY. @RISK® allows analysts to develop  
12 models incorporating uncertainty in a spreadsheet environment. Uncertainty is incorporated by  
13 specifying the probability distribution that reflects the specific risk, providing the necessary  
14 parameters that describe the probability distribution, and letting @RISK® sample values from the  
15 probability distributions based on the parameters provided. The values sampled from the  
16 probability distributions reflect their relative likelihood of occurrence. The parameters required  
17 for appropriately quantifying risk are not developed in @RISK® but in analyses external to  
18 @RISK®.

### 20 **2.2.2 R Statistical Software**

21 The risk models used in AURORAxmp® were developed in R ([www.r-project.org](http://www.r-project.org)). R is an  
22 open-source statistical software environment that compiles on several platforms. It is released  
23 under the GNU GPL (GNU General Public License) and is free software. R supports the  
24 development of risk models through an object-oriented, functional scripting environment; that is,  
25 it provides an interface for managing proprietary risk models and has a native random number



1 generator useful for sampling distributions from any kernel. For the various risk models, the  
2 historical data is processed in R, the risk models are calibrated, and the risk distributions for  
3 input into AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> are generated in a unified environment.  
4

### 5 **2.2.3 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>**

6 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> (version 11.5.1001) is used to forecast electricity market prices. For all  
7 assumptions other than those explicitly enumerated in section 2.3 of this Study, the model uses  
8 data provided by the developer, EPIS Inc. AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> uses a linear program to minimize  
9 the cost of meeting load in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), subject to a  
10 number of operating constraints. Given the solution (specifically, an output level for all  
11 generating resources and a flow level for all interties), the price at any hub is the cost, including  
12 wheeling and losses, of delivering a unit of power from the least-cost available resource. This  
13 approximates the price of electricity by assuming that all resources are centrally dispatched, the  
14 equivalent of cost-minimization in production theory, and that the marginal cost of producing  
15 electricity approximates the price.  
16

#### 17 **2.2.3.1 Operating Risk Models**

18 Uncertainty in each of the following variables is modeled as independent:

- 19 (a) WECC loads
- 20 (b) Natural Gas Price
- 21 (c) Regional Hydroelectric Generation
- 22 (d) Pacific Northwest (PNW) Hourly Wind Generation
- 23 (e) CGS Generation
- 24 (f) PNW Hourly Intertie Availability
- 25 (g) PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expenses

1 Each model uses historical data to calibrate a statistical model. The model can then, by Monte  
2 Carlo simulation, generate a distribution of outcomes. Each realization from the joint  
3 distribution of these models constitutes one game and serves as input to AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>. Where  
4 applicable, that game also serves as input to RevSim. The prices from AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>,  
5 combined with the generation and expenses from RevSim, constitute one net revenue game.  
6 Each risk model may not generate 3,200 games, and where necessary a bootstrap is used to  
7 produce a full distribution of 3,200 games. Each of the 3,200 draws from the joint distribution is  
8 identified uniquely, which guarantees coordination between AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> prices and RevSim  
9 inventory levels.

#### 11 **2.2.3.2 Revenue Simulation Model (RevSim)**

12 RevSim calculates secondary energy revenues, balancing power purchase expenses, system  
13 augmentation purchase expenses, and 4(h)(10)(C) credits for use in the Rate Analysis Model  
14 (RAM2016). It also simulates PS operating net revenue for use in ToolKit. Inputs to RevSim  
15 include the output of certain risk models discussed above (to the extent that they affect  
16 generation and loads) and prices from AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>. RevSim also uses deterministic monthly  
17 load and resource data; revenue and expenses from RAM2016; and non-varying revenues and  
18 expenses from the Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-16-E-BPA-02, and section 2 of the  
19 Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01.

21 RevSim uses the monthly risk data generated by the risk models and the monthly electricity  
22 prices estimated by AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> to compute secondary energy revenues, balancing power  
23 purchases expenses, system augmentation expenses, and section 4(h)(10)(C) credits for each of  
24 the 3,200 games. The results are used in the revenue forecast and the calculation of power rates  
25 in RAM2016. The monthly flat secondary energy values calculated by RevSim for all 3,200

1 games per fiscal year are inputs to the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk  
2 Model, which calculates the average PS transmission and ancillary services expenses included in  
3 the Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-16-E-BPA-02. The transmission and ancillary  
4 services expenses calculated by the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk  
5 Model for 3,200 games per fiscal year are input into RevSim for use in calculating net revenue  
6 risk.

7  
8 Expenses associated with the purchase of system augmentation are estimated using two  
9 approaches, one applying to the calculation of rates in RAM2016 and another determining net  
10 revenue provided to the ToolKit model. Each of these approaches is discussed in detail in  
11 section 2.6.2 of this Study.

12  
13 RevSim uses the risk data generated by the various risk models and the monthly electricity  
14 market prices estimated by AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> to calculate 3,200 annual net revenue outcomes for  
15 each fiscal year of the rate period. These are input into ToolKit, which evaluates whether a  
16 given risk mitigation package achieves BPA's 95 percent TPP standard for the rate period.

17  
18 Figure 1 shows the processes and interactions among the models and studies.

#### 20 **2.2.4 Non-Operating Risk Model**

21 NORM is an analytical risk tool that quantifies the impacts of "non-operating" risks in the  
22 ratesetting process. It was first used in ratesetting in the WP-02 rate proceeding. NORM models  
23 PS risks that are not incorporated into RevSim, such as risks around corporate costs covered by  
24 power rates and debt service-related risks. NORM also models some changes in revenue and  
25 some changes in cash flow. While the operating risk models and RevSim are used to quantify

1 operating risks, such as variability in economic conditions, load, and generating resource  
2 capability, NORM is used to model risks surrounding projections of non-operations-related  
3 revenue or expense levels in the PS revenue requirement. NORM models the accrual impacts of  
4 the included risks, as well as Net Revenue-to-Cash (NRTC) adjustments, which translate the net  
5 revenue impacts into cash flow impacts. NORM supplies 3,200 games (or iterations) of net  
6 revenue and cash flow impacts of the risks that it models. The outputs from NORM, along with  
7 the outputs from RevSim, are passed to the ToolKit model to assess the TPP.

#### 8 9 **2.2.4.1 NORM Methodology**

10 NORM follows BPA's traditional approach to modeling risks, which uses Monte Carlo  
11 simulation. In this technique, a model runs through a number of games or iterations. In each  
12 game, each modeled uncertainty is randomly assigned a value from its probability distribution  
13 based on input specifications for that uncertainty. After all of the games are run, the results can  
14 be analyzed and summarized or passed to other tools.

#### 15 16 **2.2.4.2 Data Gathering and Development of Probability Distributions**

17 New risks for inclusion in NORM are identified based on review of historical results and  
18 querying of subject matter experts. If a financial risk has a significant range of financial  
19 uncertainty and the risk is suitable for quantitative modeling, it is included in the model. If a risk  
20 has a significant range of financial uncertainty, but is not suitable for modeling, it is handled in  
21 the qualitative risk analysis and mitigation. *See* section 4 below.

22  
23 To obtain the data used to develop the probability distributions used by NORM, subject matter  
24 experts were interviewed for each capital and expense item modeled. The subject matter experts  
25 were asked to assess the risks concerning their cost estimates, including the possible range of

1 outcomes and the associated probabilities of occurrence. In some instances, the subject matter  
2 experts provided a complete probability distribution.

3  
4 After data is gathered, risks are modeled using Excel<sup>®</sup> and @RISK<sup>®</sup>. Risks are generally  
5 modeled using continuous or discrete probability distributions, selected to best match the  
6 available data on the risk. Serial correlation (correlation over time) and correlation between  
7 different risks are included in the modeling when relevant and assessable.

### 8 9 **2.3 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> Model Inputs**

10 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> produces a single electricity price forecast as a function of its inputs; that is, to  
11 produce a given number of price forecasts requires that AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> be run that same number  
12 of times, using different inputs. Risk models provide inputs to AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>, and the resulting  
13 distribution of market price forecasts represents a quantitative measure of market price risk. As  
14 mentioned, 3,200 independent games from the joint distribution of the risk models serve as the  
15 basis for the 3,200 market price forecasts. The monthly Heavy Load Hour (HLH) and Light  
16 Load Hour (LLH) electricity prices constitute the market price forecast. The following  
17 subsections describe the various inputs and risk models used in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>.

#### 18 19 **2.3.1 Natural Gas Prices Used in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>**

20 The price of natural gas is the predominant factor in determining the dispatch cost of a natural  
21 gas generator. When natural gas-fired resources are the marginal unit (the least-cost available  
22 generator to supply an incremental unit of energy), the price of natural gas determines the price  
23 of electricity. As natural gas prices rise, so does the dispatch cost of a natural gas-fired  
24 generator. To the extent that natural gas plants represent the marginal generation, rising natural  
25 gas prices translate into an increase in the market price for electricity.

### 2.3.1.1 Methodology for Deriving AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> Zone Natural Gas Prices

Each natural gas plant modeled in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> operates using fuel priced at a natural gas hub according to the zone in which it is located. Each zone is a geographic subset of the WECC, detailed in Figure 2. The following describes how AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> derives natural gas prices in each zone.

The foundation of natural gas prices in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> is the price at Henry Hub, a trading hub near Erath, Louisiana. Cash prices at Henry Hub are the primary reference point for the North American natural gas market.

Though Henry Hub is the point of reference for natural gas markets, AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> uses prices for 11 gas trading hubs in the WECC. The prices at hubs other than Henry are derived using their basis differentials, or the differences in prices between Henry Hub and the hub in question. Basis differentials reflect differences in the regional costs of supplying gas to meet demand after accounting for pipeline constraints and pipeline costs. The 11 western hubs represent three major supply basins that are the source for most of the natural gas delivered in the western United States and western regional demand areas.

Sumas, Washington, is the primary hub for delivery of gas from the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin to western Washington and western Oregon. The Opal, Wyoming, hub represents the collection of Rocky Mountain supply basins that supply gas to the Pacific Northwest and California. The San Juan Basin has its own hub, which primarily delivers gas to southern California. AECO, the primary trading hub in Alberta, Canada, is the primary benchmark for Canadian gas prices. Kingsgate is the hub that is associated with the demand center in Spokane, Washington. Two eastern Oregon hub locations, Stanfield and Malin, are included because major pipelines intersect at those locations. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)

1 Citygate represents demand centers in Northern California. Topock, Arizona and Ehrenberg,  
2 Arizona represent intermediary locations between the San Juan Basin and demand centers in  
3 Southern California. *See* Figure 3. For purposes of the basis differential forecast, the same price  
4 is used for both of these hubs, as they are relatively specific to Southern California markets.  
5 Finally, Southern California Citygate represents demand centers in Southern California. The  
6 forecast of basis differentials is derived from historical price differences between Henry Hub and  
7 each of the other 11 trading hubs, along with projections of regional supply and demand.

8  
9 The final step is to estimate the basis differential between each of the western trading hubs and  
10 its associated AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> zone. Sumas, AECO, Kingsgate, Stanfield, Malin, and PG&E  
11 Citygate are associated with the Pacific Northwest, Northern California, and Canadian zones.  
12 Opal is associated with the Montana, Idaho South, Wyoming, and Utah zones. San Juan,  
13 Topock, Ehrenberg, and Southern California Citygate are associated with the Nevada, Southern  
14 California, Arizona, and New Mexico zones.

### 16 **2.3.1.2 Recent Natural Gas Market Fundamentals**

17 U.S. natural gas production continues to climb from 56 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in 2009  
18 to an all-time high of more than 70 bcf/d in 2014. *See* Figure 5. The marginal cost of production  
19 continues to drop as advances in technology improve the efficiency of production in all phases,  
20 including exploration, drilling, and well stimulation. With the addition of new pipeline and  
21 processing infrastructure, supply that was previously constrained can now reach the market.  
22 Further supply growth has been seen with associated gas resulting from an increase in domestic  
23 oil production. As a byproduct of oil production, associated gas has virtually no cost and now  
24 accounts for more than 10 percent of domestic natural gas supply.

1 With the exception of the winter of 2013–2014 and the recovery period that followed that time,  
2 the Henry Hub cash price has bounced between \$3.08/MMBtu and \$4.41/MMBtu over the past  
3 two years. *See* Figure 4. The winter of 2013–2014 faced record demand due to cold weather and  
4 led to increased prices and a record pace of storage withdrawals. This spike in demand provided  
5 an opportunity to test the natural gas market price response to demand growth. Even with Henry  
6 Hub reaching as high as \$7.92/MMBtu in March of 2014 following supply concerns, production  
7 was able to refill storage inventory at a record injection pace (*see* Figure 6) and prices gradually  
8 dropped below \$4/MMBtu by the middle of July 2014. Storage inventory ended the injection  
9 season at 3.611 trillion cubic feet (tcf), only 237 bcf below the five-year average. At this time it  
10 is apparent that without robust weather-related demand, supply is outpacing demand, and the  
11 abundant supply in the market could lead to a storage inventory as high as 1.900 tcf at the end of  
12 withdrawal season.

13  
14 Upon market recovery, including gas in storage following the winter of 2013–2014, demand  
15 growth has been gradual (*see* Figure 7) while still not enough to substantially lift prices.  
16 Residential and commercial demand has been fairly flat with periods of increased heating or  
17 cooling demand during extreme weather events. Power generation demand for natural gas  
18 fluctuates with the price relationship to coal and overall generation demand. Improving  
19 economic conditions have created growth in the industrial demand for gas over the past five  
20 years. With an outlook indicating robust domestic natural gas supply keeping pace or slightly  
21 outpacing demand over the next several years, downward pressure is being placed on the price of  
22 natural gas.



1 **2.3.1.3 Henry Hub Forecast**

2 The average of the monthly forecast of Henry Hub prices is \$3.86/MMBtu (million British  
3 thermal units) during FY 2016 and \$4.05/MMBtu during FY 2017. *See* Table 1.

4 Prices in the FY 2016–2017 rate period are expected to remain just under \$4.00/MMBtu in  
5 FY 2016 and gradually increase along with demand growth in FY 2017. Depending on the  
6 makeup of supply from associated gas, dry gas, and wet shale, gas prices should eventually settle  
7 out at the long-term marginal cost of production of natural gas barring any major spikes in  
8 demand.

9  
10 Many factors limit the upside risk for natural gas. Pipeline infrastructure and processing  
11 capacity continue to come online in the Northeast U.S. to provide relief for constrained supply  
12 and allow for an increase in production. A backlog of more than 1,500 wells in the Marcellus  
13 Shale formation are awaiting pipeline take-away capacity and are expected to quickly add to  
14 supply once the infrastructure is in place. The Utica Shale, located next to the Marcellus, is a  
15 promising new play that is expected to rapidly step up production over the next few years.  
16 Basins such as the Permian and Anadarko have recently stepped up implementation of the newer  
17 drilling technology and are expected to provide strong supply growth. The South-Central  
18 Oklahoma Oil Province (SCOOP) and STACK (named for stacked zones) plays of Oklahoma, as  
19 well as several other plays currently being explored, are likely to provide additional upside to  
20 supply potential. While many rigs have turned to drilling for oil due to higher rates of return,  
21 associated gas produced from oil drilling continues to increase and is essentially free.

22 Downward price pressure results as more than 10 percent of domestic natural gas supply is  
23 currently sourced from associated gas. At the same time, technically recoverable resource  
24 estimates continue to grow and provide the market confidence in the long-term supply of  
25 low-cost natural gas.

1 Advances in technology are contributing greatly to the continued growth in domestic natural gas  
2 supply. *See* Figure 5. Technology is allowing for reduced production costs and increased  
3 performance. Greater use of multi-pad development with sliding infrastructure has been  
4 implemented, along with extended lateral lengths and enhanced lateral spacing. Improved  
5 targeting of sweet spots is possible due to computer applications such as three-dimensional  
6 geological modeling and petrographic studies. Borehole geophysics also allows for new  
7 diagnostic tools as drilling takes place. Once wells are drilled, advances in slickening agents and  
8 recycling of fluids used in recovering the natural gas are increasing the success of stimulating  
9 wells.

10  
11 As the price of natural gas remains competitive with other fuels and supply continues to grow,  
12 demand growth is expected to follow. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand will begin with  
13 Sabine Pass coming online in 2016 and Cove Point beginning operation in 2017; however,  
14 exports from these facilities will not exceed two bcf/d prior to the end of the FY 2016–2017 time  
15 period. Natural gas-fired power generation demand is a wild card over the next few years.  
16 Several regulations and policies have been put in place to discourage coal-fired generation, and  
17 these changes will likely create demand for additional natural gas-fired generation. With the  
18 unknown impact from these regulations on coal-fired generation in addition to the rapid growth  
19 of renewables in the market, the impact on natural gas demand is yet to be determined.

20 Industrial demand is looking to natural gas as a fuel source as the economy recovers and new  
21 industrial facilities are being constructed. Mainly the industrial demand is increasing in the Gulf  
22 and Southeast regions as there is a need for production of ammonia, methanol, and other gas to  
23 liquids. Exports to Mexico are another source of demand as Mexico brings on new natural  
24 gas-fired generation and increases dependence on a low-cost U.S. natural gas supply. Barring

1 any extreme weather-related demand, residential and commercial demand is expected to remain  
2 fairly flat through the FY 2016–2017 time period.

3  
4 As with any forecast, there is risk involved. Weather-related demand is a factor regardless of  
5 whether there is a great deal of, or lack of, such demand. A recent development is a drop in oil  
6 price to below \$80/barrel. An additional sustained drop in oil price may lead to the shut-in of  
7 some oil production, which would directly reduce the production of essentially no-cost  
8 associated gas. Additional regulations or policies at the state or federal level could also have an  
9 influence on the price of natural gas. The cost of natural gas could be impacted if any new  
10 policies or regulations increase production costs and decrease efficiency. Similarly, the  
11 transportation cost of natural gas could be impacted if regulations are put in place regarding the  
12 reduction of methane emissions, pipeline replacement requirements, or stricter infrastructure  
13 permitting. Also, the impacts of approved and proposed EPA emission rules may have a direct  
14 effect on natural gas-fired generation demand as coal plants retire or utilities choose to source  
15 generation from natural gas. Lastly, there is the potential for LNG-related volatility to enter the  
16 market in 2017 from anticipation as the many LNG export facilities set to come online between  
17 2018 and 2020 will be securing new supply needed for facility testing and storage.

18  
19 Upward pressure on the price of natural gas will likely be minimal due to the abundant supply of  
20 gas available at low prices. The rate period natural gas price outlook still appears bound between  
21 the \$3.50 and \$4.50 range. Above \$4.50, many more basins would provide attractive rates of  
22 return, and the resulting responsiveness of supply should provide relief to the market. Below  
23 \$3.50, coal-to-gas switching increases and some plays become less profitable, thereby  
24 encouraging a supply correction.

1 **2.3.1.4 The Basis Differential Forecast**

2 Table 1 shows the basis differential forecast for the 11 trading hubs in the western U.S. used by  
3 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>. The location of natural gas supply source growth can dramatically change  
4 basis relationships as traditional pipeline flows are altered and even reversed. Production levels  
5 in both the Rocky Mountains and Western Canada directly impact the relationships among  
6 western hubs. Additionally, pipeline transportation availability and cost can impact basis  
7 relationships.

8  
9 The AECO and Kingsgate bases will likely decrease slightly over time with Northeast U.S.  
10 production displacing the ability for Western Canadian production to supply Eastern Canada.  
11 Canadian production is relatively flat due to the current price environment; however, it will need  
12 to gradually increase for Canada to pursue LNG export contracts. The Sumas and Stanfield  
13 bases are likely to decrease only modestly over the next few years as they are positioned between  
14 supply hubs with decreasing prices and California hubs with sustained strong prices.

15  
16 The Opal basis is expected to decrease over time as production in the Northeast continues to  
17 increase and reduce the amount of Rocky Mountain gas that can economically be delivered  
18 eastward. Pipelines such as REX (Rockies Express Pipeline) have given shippers the ability to  
19 reverse flow to send Marcellus natural gas east-to-west contrary to the pipeline's original west-  
20 to-east design and contracts.

21  
22 The impact of a lower Opal basis, in addition to a slight decrease in the Kingsgate basis, will lead  
23 to a modest decrease in the Malin basis. The PG&E Citygate basis will likely remain at a  
24 premium compared to other gas hubs in the country as strong California natural gas demand  
25 continues and the anticipated higher cost of transportation on Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E)  
26 Redwood Path takes effect and steps up over time.

1 The Southern California hubs of Topock, Ehrenberg, and Southern California Citygate are  
2 expected to remain relatively steady. Even with supply growth in the Permian, natural gas  
3 exports to Mexico may place a slight upward pressure on Southwest prices in addition to  
4 continued California demand for natural gas. The producing San Juan Basin basis is expected to  
5 decrease slightly as Permian supply growth continues.

### 6 7 **2.3.1.5 Natural Gas Price Risk**

8 Uncertainty regarding the price of natural gas is fundamental in evaluating electricity market  
9 price risk. Again, to the extent that natural gas-fired generators deliver the marginal unit of  
10 electricity, the price of natural gas largely determines the market price of electricity.

11 Furthermore, as natural gas is an energy commodity, the price of natural gas is expected to  
12 fluctuate, and that volatility is an important source of market uncertainty.

13  
14 The natural gas risk model simulates daily natural gas prices, generates a distribution of  
15 875 natural gas price forecasts, and presumes that the gas price forecast represents the median of  
16 the resultant distribution. Model parameters are estimated using historical Henry Hub natural  
17 gas prices. Once estimated, the parameters serve as the basis for simulated possible future Henry  
18 Hub price streams.

19  
20 The model also constrains the minimum price to \$1. Furthermore, because RAM2016 and the  
21 TPP calculations use only monthly electricity prices from AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>, and the addition of  
22 daily natural gas prices does not appreciably affect either the volatility or expected value of  
23 monthly electricity prices, the distribution of simulated natural gas prices is aggregated by month  
24 prior to being input into AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>. The mean, median, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the  
25 forecast distribution are reported in Table 2.

1 **2.3.2 Load Forecasts Used in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>**

2 This Study uses the West Interconnect topology, which comprises 31 zones. It is one of the  
3 default zone topologies supplied with the AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> model and requires a load forecast for  
4 each zone.

5  
6 **2.3.2.1 Load Forecast**

7 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> uses a WECC-wide, long-term load forecast as the base load forecast. Default  
8 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> forecasts are used for areas outside the United States. BPA produced a monthly  
9 load forecast for each balancing authority in the WECC for the rate period. As AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>  
10 uses a cut-plane topology (*see* Figure 2) that does not correspond to the WECC balancing  
11 authorities, it is necessary to map the balancing authority load forecast onto the AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>  
12 zones. *See* Power Risk and Market Price Study Documentation (Documentation), BP-16-E-  
13 BPA-04A, Table 1. The forecast by balancing authority is in Documentation Table 2.

14  
15 **2.3.2.2 Load Risk Model**

16 The load risk model uses a combination of three statistical methods to generate annual, monthly,  
17 and hourly load risk distributions that, when combined, constitute an hourly load forecast for use  
18 in AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>. When referring to the load model, this Study is referring to the combination  
19 of these models.

20  
21 **2.3.2.3 Yearly Load Model**

22 The annual load model addresses variability in loads created by long-term economic patterns;  
23 that is, it incorporates variability at the yearly level and captures business cycles and other  
24 departures from forecast that do not have impacts measurable at the sub-yearly level. The model  
25 is calibrated using historical annual loads for each control area in the WECC, as aggregated into

1 the AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> zones defined in the West Interconnect topology. Furthermore, it assumes  
2 that load growth at the annual level is correlated across regions, as defined by the Pacific  
3 Northwest; California including Baja; Canada; and the Desert Southwest (which comprises all  
4 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> areas not listed in the other three). It also assumes that load growth is correlated  
5 perfectly within them. This assumption guarantees that zones within each of these regions will  
6 follow similar annual variability patterns.

7  
8 The model takes as given the history of annual loads at the balancing authority level, as provided  
9 in FERC Form 714 filings from 1993 to 2013 and aggregated into the regions described above.  
10 The model estimates the load in each region using a time series econometric model. Once the  
11 model is estimated, the parameters of the model are used to generate simulated load growth  
12 patterns for each AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> zone.

#### 14 **2.3.2.4 Monthly Load Risk**

15 Monthly load variability accounts for seasonal uncertainty in load patterns. The risk posed to  
16 BPA revenue reflected through price variability due to seasonal load variations is potentially  
17 substantial. Unseasonably hot summers in California, the Pacific Northwest, and the inland  
18 Southwest have the potential to exert substantial pressure on prices at Mid-C and, as such, are an  
19 important component of price risk.

20  
21 In addition to an annual load forecast produced in average megawatts, AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> requires  
22 factors for each month of a forecast year that, upon multiplication by the annual load forecast,  
23 yield the monthly load, also in average megawatts. As such, the monthly load risk is represented  
24 by a distribution of vectors of 12 factors with a mean of one. The monthly load risk model  
25 generates a distribution of series of these factors for the duration of the forecast period.

1 The monthly load model takes as given the historical monthly load for each AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup>  
2 zone, normalized by their annual averages and centered on zero. These historical load factors,  
3 which average to zero for any given year, constitute the observations used to calibrate a  
4 statistical model that generates a distribution of monthly load factors.

### 6 **2.3.3 Hourly Load Risk**

7 Hourly load risk embodies short-term price risk, as would be expected during cold snaps, warm  
8 spells, and other short-term phenomena. While this form of risk may not exert substantial  
9 pressure on monthly average prices, it generates variability within months and represents a form  
10 of risk that would not be captured in long-term business cycles or seasonal trends as reflected in  
11 the monthly and annual load risk models.

13 The hourly load model takes as inputs hourly loads for each AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> zone from 2002 to  
14 2013. The model groups these hourly load observations by week and month, and each group of  
15 week-long hourly load observations constitutes a sample for its respective month. It then  
16 normalizes the historical hourly loads by their monthly averages, so the sample space is  
17 composed of hourly factors with an average of 1, and then uses a simple bootstrap with  
18 replacement to draw sets of week-long, hourly observations from each month. Each draw thus  
19 comprises 9,072 hours (54 weeks), with an average of 1. The model repeats this process  
20 50 times, which generates 50 year-long hourly load factor time series. These 50 draws are  
21 assigned randomly to the 3,200 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> runs.



1 **2.3.4 Hydroelectric Generation**

2 Hydroelectric generation is a primary driver of Mid-Columbia electricity prices in  
3 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> because it represents a substantial portion of the average generation in the  
4 region. Thus, fluctuations in its output can have a substantial effect on the marginal generator.  
5

6 **2.3.4.1 PNW Hydro Generation Risk**

7 The PNW hydroelectric generation risk factor reflects uncertainty regarding the timing and  
8 volume of streamflows. Given streamflows, HYDSIM computes PNW hydroelectric generation  
9 amounts in average monthly values. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03,  
10 § 3.2, for a description of HYDSIM. HYDSIM produces 80 records of PNW monthly  
11 hydroelectric generation, each one year long, based on actual water conditions in the region from  
12 1929 through 2008 as applied to the current hydro development and operational constraints. For  
13 each of the 3,200 games, the model samples one of the 80 water years for the first year of the rate  
14 period (FY 2016) from a discrete uniform probability distribution using R, the software  
15 described in section 2.2.1 above. The model then selects the next historical water year for the  
16 following year of the rate period, FY 2017 (*e.g.*, if the model uses 1929 for FY 2016, then it  
17 selects 1930 for FY 2017). Should the model sample 2008 for fiscal 2016, it uses 1929 for  
18 FY 2017. The model repeats this process for each of the 3,200 games and guarantees a uniform  
19 distribution over the 80 water years. The resulting 3,200 water year combinations become  
20 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> inputs.  
21

22 **2.3.4.2 British Columbia (BC) Hydro Generation Risk**

23 BC hydroelectric generation risk reflects uncertainty in the timing and volume of streamflows  
24 and the impacts on monthly hydroelectric generation in British Columbia. The risk model uses  
25 historical generation data from 1977 through 2008. The source of this information is Statistics  
26 Canada, a publication produced by the Canadian government. Because hydrological patterns,

1 including runoff and hydroelectric generation, in BC are statistically independent of those in the  
2 PNW, BPA samples historical water years from BC independently from the PNW water year, as  
3 drawn per section 2.3.4.1 above. As with the PNW, water years are drawn in sequence.  
4

### 5 **2.3.4.3 California Hydro Generation Risk**

6 California hydroelectric generation risk reflects uncertainty with respect to the timing and  
7 volume of streamflows and the impacts on monthly hydroelectric generation in California.  
8 Historical generation data from 1970–2008 was sourced from the California Energy Commission  
9 (CEC), the Federal Power Commission, and the Energy Information Agency (EIA). As with the  
10 BC hydro risk model, and for the same reasons, CA water years are drawn independently of  
11 PNW water years.  
12

### 13 **2.3.4.4 Hydro Shaping**

14 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> uses an algorithm to dispatch hydro generation. This algorithm produces an  
15 hourly hydroelectric generation value that depends on average daily and hourly load, the average  
16 monthly hydro generation (provided by HYDSIM), and the output of any resource defined as  
17 “must run.” Several constraints give the user control over minimum and maximum generation  
18 levels, the degree of hydro shaping (*i.e.*, the extent to which it follows load), and so on.

19 AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> uses the default hydro shaping logic, with one exception.  
20

21 Output from AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> suggests that its hydro shaping algorithm generates a diurnal  
22 generation pattern that is inappropriate during high water; that is, the ratio of HLH generation to  
23 LLH generation is too high. It is recognized that high water compromises the ability of the  
24 hydro system to shape hydro between on-peak and off-peak hours. AURORAxmp<sup>®</sup> limits  
25 minimum generation to 44 percent of nameplate capacity during May and June, but operations

1 data suggest that this system minimum generation can be as high as 75 percent of nameplate  
2 capacity during high water months. To address this difference, a separate model is used to  
3 implement the minimum generation constraints. These constraints generally restrict the  
4 minimum generation to a higher percentage of nameplate capacity than default AURORAxmp®  
5 settings and reflect observed constraints to the degree to which the system can more realistically  
6 shape hydroelectric generation.

7  
8 To implement this ratio in AURORAxmp®, the model limits the minimum hydro generation in  
9 each month to the expected ratio of minimum generation to nameplate capacity based on an  
10 econometric model.

### 11 12 **2.3.5 Hourly Shape of Wind Generation**

13 AURORAxmp® models wind generation as a must-run resource with a minimum capacity of  
14 70 percent. This assumption implies that, for any given hour, AURORAxmp® dispatches  
15 70 percent of the available capacity independent of economic fundamentals and the remaining  
16 30 percent as needed. The current amount of wind generation operating in the PNW is just over  
17 8,200 MW. The large amount of wind in the PNW (and the rest of the WECC) affects the  
18 market price forecast at Mid-C by changing the generating resource used to determine the  
19 marginal price. Modeling wind generation on an hourly basis better captures the operational  
20 impacts that changes in wind generation can have on the marginal resource compared to using  
21 average monthly wind generation values. The hourly granularity for wind generation allows the  
22 price forecast to more accurately reflect the economic decision faced by thermal generators.  
23 Each hour they must decide whether to operate in a volatile market in which the marginal price  
24 can be below the cost of running the thermal generator, but start-up and shut-off constraints  
25 could prevent the generator from shutting down.

1 **2.3.5.1 PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk**

2 The PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model simulates the uncertainty in wind generation  
3 output that is derived by averaging the observed output of the BPA wind fleet every five minutes  
4 for each hour and converting the data into hourly capacity factors. The source of these data is  
5 BPA’s external Web site, www.bpa.gov. The data cover the period from 2006 through 2013.  
6 The model implements a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling algorithm to generate  
7 synthetic series of wind generation data. This technique allows the production of statistically  
8 valid artificial wind series that preserve the higher-order moments of observed wind time series.  
9 Through this process, the model creates 30 time series that include 8,784 hours to create a  
10 complete wind year. The model randomly samples these synthetic records and applies them as a  
11 forced outage rate against the wind fleet in select AURORAxmp® zones. This approach  
12 captures potential variations in annual, monthly, and hourly wind generation.

13  
14 **2.3.5.2 PNW Wind Dispatch Cost**

15 The dispatch cost of wind in the PNW is assigned using data reported during 2012 oversupply  
16 events. BPA reported the magnitude of hourly curtailment events during 2012, along with the  
17 monthly costs of those events. Using the quantity of wind curtailment along with the cost allows  
18 us to infer the cost per aMW of curtailment. BPA imposes a cap of \$100 on the displacement  
19 cost of wind in an effort to be conservative, and apply that cost curve to wind generators in no  
20 particular order.

21  
22 **2.3.6 Thermal Plant Generation**

23 The thermal generation units in AURORAxmp® often drive the marginal unit price, whether the  
24 units are natural gas, coal, or nuclear. With the exception of CGS generation, operation of  
25 thermal resources in AURORAxmp® is based on the EPIS-supplied database labeled North  
26 American DB 2014-02.

1    **2.3.6.1 Columbia Generating Station Generation Risk**

2    The CGS Generation Risk Model simulates monthly variability in the output of CGS such that  
3    the average of the simulated outcomes is equal to the expected monthly CGS output specified in  
4    the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 3.1.3. The simulated results vary  
5    from the maximum output of the plant to zero output. The frequency distribution of the  
6    simulated CGS output is negatively skewed: the median is higher than the mean. The shape of  
7    the frequency distribution reflects the reality that thermal plants such as CGS typically operate at  
8    output levels higher than average output levels, but occasional forced outages result in lower  
9    monthly average output levels. The output of the model feeds both RevSim (*see* section 2.5  
10   below) and AURORAxmp®, where the results of the model are converted into equivalent forced  
11   outage rates and applied to the nameplate capacity of CGS for each of 3,200 games. The  
12   simulated frequency distribution for CGS output for October 2015 is shown in Figure 1 of the  
13   Documentation.

14  
15   **2.3.7 Generation Additions Due to WECC-Wide Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)**

16   As a result of RPS standards, renewable resource additions have been substantial during recent  
17   years. The timing of incentives and structure of markets for Renewable Energy Credits (RECs)  
18   spawned a surge in renewable resource additions well in advance of need and somewhat  
19   independent of economic fundamentals. Two sources of data are used to quantify this growth.

20  
21   First, a consultant was engaged to produce a model capable of quantifying the renewable  
22   generation needed to meet each state’s RPS goals on an annual basis. This, in combination with  
23   existing and planned renewable projects, provides the basis for all renewable resource additions  
24   to AURORAxmp®. Second, AURORAxmp® has logic capable of adding and retiring resources  
25   based upon economics. In ‘capacity expansion’ mode, AURORAxmp® generates a catalogue of  
26   resource additions and retirements consistent with long-term equilibrium: it (1) identifies any

1 plants whose operating revenue is insufficient to cover their fixed and variable costs of operation  
2 and retires them; and (2) selects plants from a candidate list of additions whose operating  
3 revenue would cover their fixed and variable costs and adds them to the resource base. Via this  
4 process, AURORAxmp® ensures that resources are added when economic circumstances justify.  
5 AURORAxmp® adds no new thermal resources to the PNW during the BP-16 rate period. The  
6 WECC-wide resource additions are shown in Documentation Figure 2.

### 8 **2.3.8 Transmission Capacity Availability**

9 In AURORAxmp®, transmission capacity limits the amount of electricity that can be transferred  
10 between zones. Figure 2 shows the AURORAxmp® representation of the major transmission  
11 interconnections for the West Interconnect topology. The transmission path ratings for the  
12 California-Oregon Intertie (AC Intertie or COI), the Direct Current Intertie (DC Intertie), and the  
13 BC Intertie are based on historical intertie reports posted on the BPA OASIS Web site from 2003  
14 through 2013. The ratings for the rest of the interconnections are based on the EPIS-supplied  
15 database labeled North American DB 2014-02.

#### 17 **2.3.8.1 PNW Hourly Intertie Availability Risk**

18 PNW hourly intertie risk represents uncertainty in the availability of transmission capacity on  
19 each of three interties that connect the PNW with other regions in the WECC: AC Intertie,  
20 DC Intertie, and BC Intertie. The PNW hourly intertie risk model implements a Markov Chain  
21 duration model based on observed data from 2003–2013. The data comprise observed  
22 transmission path ratings and the duration of those ratings for both directions on each line.

24 The model begins with an observed path rating and duration from the historical record. It  
25 samples the proximate path rating using a Markov Chain that has been estimated with observed

1 data. Then, it samples a duration for that rating based on observed durations for that specific  
2 rating. This process repeats until an 8784 hour record has been constructed. The model  
3 generates 200 artificial records. Path ratings are rounded to avoid a Markov Chain that is too  
4 sparse to effectively generate synthetic profiles.

5  
6 For each of 3,200 games, each intertie has a single record that is independently selected from the  
7 associated set of 200 records. The outage rate is applied to the Link Capacity Shape, a factor that  
8 determines the amount of power that can be moved between zones in AURORAxmp® for the  
9 associated intertie. By using this method, quantification of this risk results in the average of the  
10 simulated outcomes being equal to the expected path ratings in the historical record.

#### 11 12 **2.4 Market Price Forecasts Produced By AURORAxmp®**

13 Two electricity price forecasts are created using AURORAxmp®. The market price forecast  
14 uses hydro generation data for all 80 water years, and the critical water forecast uses hydro  
15 generation for only the critical water year 1937. Table 3 shows the FY 2016 through FY 2017  
16 monthly HLH and LLH prices from the market price forecast.

17  
18 Table 4 shows the FY 2016 and FY 2017 HLH and LLH prices of the critical water forecast.  
19 The mean and median of the market price run are shown in Documentation Figures 3 and 4.  
20 The same information for the critical water run is shown in Documentation Figures 5 and 6.

#### 21 22 **2.5 Inputs to RevSim**

23 As noted earlier, RevSim calculates secondary energy revenues, balancing and augmentation  
24 power purchases expenses, and 4(h)(10)(C) credits that are used by RAM2016. It also  
25 determines, by simulation, PS operating net revenue risk, used by the ToolKit Model. Inputs to

1 RevSim include risk data simulated by various risk models (*see* section 2.2.3.1 above) and  
2 market prices calculated by AURORAxmp®, along with deterministic monthly data from other  
3 rate development studies.

## 4 5 **2.5.1 Deterministic Data**

6 Deterministic data are data provided as single forecast values, as opposed to data presented as a  
7 distribution of many values.

### 8 9 **2.5.1.1 Loads and Resources**

10 Monthly HLH and LLH load and resource data are provided by the Power Loads and Resources  
11 Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03. A summary of these load and resource data in the form of monthly  
12 energy for FY 2016–2017 is provided in the Power Loads and Resources Study Documentation,  
13 BP-16-FS-BPA-03A, Table 4.1.1.

### 14 15 **2.5.1.2 Miscellaneous Revenues**

16 Miscellaneous revenues represent estimated revenues that are not subject to change through  
17 BPA’s ratesetting process. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01, § 4.2 for a discussion of  
18 miscellaneous revenues.

### 19 20 **2.5.1.3 Composite, Load Shaping, and Demand Revenue**

21 Composite, Non-Slice, Load Shaping, and Demand revenues are provided by RAM2016.  
22 Consistent with the Tiered Rate Methodology (TRM), Composite and Non-Slice revenues do not  
23 vary in the RevSim revenue simulation, but Load Shaping and Demand revenues do vary. The  
24 Load Shaping billing determinants and Load Shaping rates from RAM2016 are input into  
25 RevSim to facilitate the calculation of changes in Load Shaping revenue. Demand billing



1 determinants and rates from RAM2016 are input into RevSim to facilitate the calculation of  
2 changes in Demand revenue. *See* Power Rates Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-01A,  
3 Table 2.5.5.

## 4 5 **2.5.2 Risk Data**

6 Uncertainty around the deterministic data provided to RevSim must be considered in the  
7 determination of TPP in ToolKit. Specifically, the uncertainty considered in RevSim is called  
8 “operational” uncertainty, as opposed to non-operational uncertainty considered in NORM.  
9 Uncertainty in the deterministic data is represented by “risk data” or a distribution of many  
10 values.

11  
12 Operational risks represented as input data to RevSim are Federal hydro generation risk, PS load  
13 risk, CGS generation risk, PS wind generation risk, PS transmission and ancillary services  
14 expense risk, and electricity price risk. These inputs are reflected in the risk distributions for  
15 secondary energy revenues, balancing power purchases expenses, 4(h)(10)(C) credits, system  
16 augmentation expenses, and PS net revenues calculated by RevSim and provided to ToolKit.

### 17 18 **2.5.2.1 Federal Hydro Generation Risk**

19 The Federal hydro generation risk factor reflects the uncertain impacts that the timing and  
20 volume of streamflows have on monthly Federal hydro generation under specified hydro  
21 operation requirements. Federal hydro generation risk is accounted for in RevSim by inputting  
22 hydro generation estimates from the HYDSIM model and adjusting these results to account for  
23 efficiency losses associated with standing ready to provide balancing reserve capacity, which is  
24 discussed below.

1 For FY 2016–2017, average monthly hydro generation risk is accounted for based on hydro  
2 generation estimates from the HYDSIM model for monthly streamflow patterns experienced  
3 from October 1928 through September 2008 (also referred to as the 80 water years). These  
4 monthly hydro generation data are developed by simulating hydro operations sequentially over  
5 all 960 months of the 80 water years. This analysis by HYDSIM is referred to as a continuous  
6 study. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 3, regarding HYDSIM,  
7 continuous study, and 80 water years.

8  
9 For each of the 80 water years, monthly HLH and LLH energy splits for the Federal system  
10 hydro generation are developed for each fiscal year of the rate period based on HOSS analyses  
11 that incorporate results from HYDSIM hydro regulation studies. These monthly HLH and LLH  
12 regulated hydro generation estimates are combined with monthly HLH and LLH independent  
13 hydro generation estimates developed from historical data to yield total monthly Federal HLH  
14 and LLH hydro generation.

15  
16 Monthly values for Federal hydro generation for each of the 80 historical water years are  
17 provided in Documentation Table 3 for FY 2016 and Table 4 for FY 2017. Monthly values for  
18 Federal hydro HLH generation ratios for each of the 80 historical water years are provided in  
19 Documentation Table 5 for FY 2016 and Table 6 for FY 2017.

20  
21 Adjustments are made to the average monthly hydro generation in the 80 water year data to  
22 represent efficiency losses associated with standing ready to provide balancing reserve capacity  
23 for load and wind variability. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03,  
24 § 3.1.2.1.5.

1 A significant factor in these adjustments is the shift of hydro generation from HLH to LLH. The  
2 generation adjustments are reported in terms of HLH, LLH, and flat energy adjustments in  
3 Documentation Tables 7–9 for FY 2016 and Tables 10–12 for FY 2017. These generation data  
4 are added to the values presented in Documentation Tables 3–4 to yield the final monthly  
5 Federal hydro generation for each of the 80 water years.

6  
7 The monthly Federal hydro generation data are input into the RevSim Model to quantify the  
8 impact that Federal hydro generation variability has on PS secondary energy sales and revenues,  
9 balancing power purchases and expenses, and net revenues for 3,200 two-year simulations  
10 (FY 2016–2017). The PS secondary energy sales data are input into the PS Transmission and  
11 Ancillary Services Expense Risk Model to calculate these expenses for 3,200 two-year  
12 simulations. See section 2.5.2.5 below regarding the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services  
13 Expense Risk Model.

14  
15 The water year sequences developed for each game for PNW hydro generation are also used for  
16 Federal hydro generation, resulting in a consistent set of PNW and Federal hydro generation  
17 being used for each game in AURORA<sup>®</sup> and RevSim. See section 2.3.4.1 above regarding  
18 the development of water year sequences for PNW hydro generation.

#### 19 20 **2.5.2.2 BPA Load Risk**

21 The BPA load risk factor represents the impacts that variability in the economy and temperature  
22 can have on PS revenues and expenses. Under the TRM, fluctuations in customer loads and  
23 revenues are considered as changes in Tier 1 loads, specifically through the Load Shaping and  
24 Demand charges. Load fluctuations are also reflected as changes in secondary energy revenues  
25 and balancing power purchases expenses. The level of regional economic activity affects the

1 annual amount of load placed on BPA. Fluctuations in load due to weather conditions cause  
2 monthly variations in loads, especially during the winter and summer when heating and cooling  
3 loads are highest. BPA annual load growth variability and monthly load variability due to  
4 weather are derived from PNW load variability simulated in the load risk model for the WECC.  
5 *See* section 2.3.2.2 above for further details regarding the load risk model for the WECC. BPA  
6 load variability is derived such that the same percentage changes in PNW loads are used to  
7 quantify BPA load variability.

8  
9 While the load risk model considers WECC-wide loads for AURORAxmp®, only the PNW  
10 component of the load risk is applied to BPA loads for the revenue simulation.

### 11 12 **2.5.2.3 CGS Generation Risk**

13 The CGS generation risk factor reflects the impact that variability in the output of CGS has on  
14 the amount of PS secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases estimated by RevSim.  
15 CGS generation risk is modeled in the CGS Generation Risk Model. The methodology used in  
16 quantifying CGS generation risk is described in section 2.3.6.1 above; it also has an impact on  
17 prices estimated by AURORAxmp®.

### 18 19 **2.5.2.4 PS Wind Generation Risk**

20 The PS wind generation risk factor reflects the uncertainty in the amount and value of the energy  
21 generated by the portions of the Condon, Klondike I and III, Stateline, and Foote Creek I and IV  
22 wind projects that are under contract to BPA.

23  
24 The uncertainty in the amount of energy generated by BPA's portions of these wind projects is  
25 simulated in the PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model, which is described in

1 section 2.3.5.1 above. Since the PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model includes the output  
2 of wind projects that do not serve BPA loads, the results from this model are scaled such that the  
3 average wind generation output is equal to the forecast wind generation in the Power Loads and  
4 Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03.

5  
6 The simulated monthly wind generation results are specified in terms of flat energy. Results  
7 shown in Documentation Figure 7 are the monthly flat energy output for all wind projects during  
8 FY 2016–2017 at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles. These monthly flat energy values are input  
9 into RevSim, where they are converted into monthly HLH and LLH energy values by applying  
10 HLH and LLH shaping factors that are associated with these wind projects. The source of these  
11 HLH and LLH shaping factors is the data used to compute the monthly HLH and LLH wind  
12 generation values included under Renewable Resources in the Power Loads and Resources  
13 Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 3.1.3.

14  
15 The uncertainty in the value of the wind generation output is calculated in RevSim based on the  
16 differences between the monthly weighted average purchase prices for all the output contracts  
17 between wind generators and BPA, and the wholesale electricity prices at which BPA can sell  
18 the amount of variable energy produced. The output contracts specify that BPA pays for only  
19 the amount of energy produced. The risk of the value of the wind generation is computed in  
20 RevSim in the following manner: (1) subtract from expenses the expected monthly payments for  
21 the expected output from all the wind projects; (2) on a game-by-game basis, compute the  
22 monthly payments for the output from all the wind projects; and (3) on a game-by-game basis,  
23 compute the revenues associated with the wind generation from all the projects.

1 Results shown in Documentation Tables 13–14 report information from which the value of wind  
2 generation during FY 2016–2017 can be observed at expected monthly flat energy output levels  
3 and variable monthly electricity prices. Total deterministic wind generation purchase costs and  
4 total revenues earned from the sale of all wind generation at average, median, 5th percentile, and  
5 95th percentile electricity prices estimated by AURORAxmp® are provided, with the value of  
6 the wind generation being the difference between the revenues earned and purchase costs paid.

#### 8 **2.5.2.5 PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk**

9 The PS transmission and ancillary services expense risk factor represents the uncertainty in  
10 PS transmission and ancillary services expenses, relative to the expected values of these  
11 expenses included in the power revenue requirement, which are \$110.2 million during FY 2016  
12 and \$106.7 million during FY 2017. *See Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation,*  
13 *BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A.* This risk is modeled in the PS Transmission and Ancillary  
14 Services Expense Risk Model.

15  
16 The modeling of this risk is based on comparisons between monthly firm PTP Network  
17 transmission capacity that PS has under contract, the amount of existing firm contract sales, and  
18 the variability in secondary energy sales estimated by RevSim. Expense risk computations  
19 reflect how transmission and ancillary services expenses vary from the cost of the fixed, take-or-  
20 pay, firm PTP Network transmission capacity that PS has under contract, which must be paid for  
21 whether or not it is used. Because PS has more firm PTP Network transmission capacity under  
22 contract than it has firm contract sales, the probability distribution for these expenses is  
23 asymmetrical. The asymmetry occurs because PS does not incur the costs of purchasing  
24 additional transmission capacity until the amount of secondary energy sales exceeds the amount  
25 of residual firm transmission capacity after serving all firm sales.

1 Under conditions in which PS sells more energy than it has firm PTP Network transmission  
2 rights, transmission and ancillary services expenses will increase. Alternatively, under  
3 conditions in which PS sells less energy than it has firm PTP Network transmission rights,  
4 transmission and ancillary services expenses will remain unchanged.

5  
6 Results shown in Documentation Figures 8 and 9 indicate how FY 2016–2017 transmission and  
7 ancillary service expenses vary depending on the amount of secondary energy sales. In these  
8 figures, the PS transmission and ancillary services expenses do not fall below \$82.5 million in  
9 FY 2016 and \$80.1 million in FY 2017, regardless of the amount of secondary energy sales,  
10 because PS must pay for the take-or-pay firm transmission capacity it has under contract.  
11 Included in these expenses are deterministic costs for the take-or-pay firm transmission capacity  
12 the PS has under contract on the Southern Interties (AC and DC).

13  
14 Results shown in Documentation Figures 10 and 11 reflect the probability distributions for  
15 transmission and ancillary service expenses during FY 2016–2017. These figures indicate how  
16 often transmission and ancillary service expenses fall within various expense ranges.

#### 18 **2.5.2.6 Electricity Price Risk (Market Price and Critical Water AURORAxmp® Runs)**

19 As noted in section 2.4 above, two runs of the AURORAxmp® model are used in this Study.  
20 One run uses hydro generation for all 80 water years, referred to as the market price run. The  
21 other run uses hydro generation for only the critical water year, 1937, and is referred to as the  
22 critical water run. Both produce 3,200 games of monthly HLH and LLH prices for FY 2016–  
23 2017.

1 Prices from the market price run are used by RevSim to develop secondary energy revenues,  
2 balancing power purchases expenses, and 4(h)(10)(C) credits for FY 2016–2017. These values  
3 are provided to RAM2016 to develop rates for FY 2016–2017.

4  
5 Prices from the critical water run are used to compute the system augmentation costs provided to  
6 RAM2016 for ratesetting purposes and prices from the market price run and critical water run  
7 are used to incorporate system augmentation expense risk in the net revenues calculated by  
8 RevSim and provided to the ToolKit. See section 2.6.2 below for a description of these  
9 processes.

## 11 **2.6 RevSim Model Outputs**

12 RevSim model outputs are provided to RAM2016, the ToolKit model, and the revenue forecast  
13 component of the Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01, § 4.

### 15 **2.6.1 4(h)(10)(C) Credits**

16 The 4(h)(10)(C) credit risk is quantified in RevSim and reflects the uncertainty in the amount of  
17 4(h)(10)(C) credits BPA receives from the U.S. Treasury. The 4(h)(10)(C) credit is the method  
18 by which BPA implements section 4(h)(10)(C) of the Northwest Power Act. Section 4(h)(10)(C)  
19 allows BPA to allocate its expenditures for system-wide fish and wildlife mitigation activities to  
20 various purposes. The credit reimburses BPA for its expenditures allocated to the non-power  
21 purposes of the Federal hydro projects. BPA reduces its annual Treasury payment by the amount  
22 of the credit. This Study estimates the amount of 4(h)(10)(C) credits available for each of the  
23 80 water years for FY 2016–2017 by summing the costs of the operating impacts on the hydro  
24 system (power purchases), direct program expenses, Pisces computer software costs, and capital



1 costs associated with BPA's fish and wildlife mitigation measures, and then multiplying the total  
2 cost by 0.223 (22.3 percent is the percentage of the FCRPS attributed to non-power purposes).

3  
4 Operating impact costs are calculated for each of the 80 water years in RevSim for FY 2016–  
5 2017 by multiplying spot market electricity prices from AURORAxmp® by the amount of  
6 power purchases (aMW) that qualifies for 4(h)(10)(C) credits. The amount of power purchases  
7 that qualifies for 4(h)(10)(C) credits is derived outside of RevSim and is used in RevSim to  
8 calculate the dollar amount of the 4(h)(10)(C) credits. A description of the methodology used to  
9 derive the amount of power purchases associated with the 4(h)(10)(C) credits is contained in the  
10 Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 3.3. The 4(h)(10)(C) power purchase  
11 amounts for FY 2016 and FY 2017 are respectively reported in Tables 2.11.1 and 2.11.2 in the  
12 Power Loads and Resources Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-03A.

13  
14 The direct program expenses, Pisces computer software costs, and capital costs for FY 2016–  
15 2017 do not vary by water volume and timing and are documented in the Power Revenue  
16 Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, §§ 3 and 4. A summary of the costs  
17 included in the 4(h)(10)(C) calculation and the resulting credit for each fiscal year are shown in  
18 Table 15 of the Documentation.

19  
20 Results shown in Documentation Figures 12 and 13 reflect the probability distributions for the  
21 4(h)(10)(C) credit during FY 2016–2017. The average 4(h)(10)(C) credit for the 3,200 games is  
22 \$95.1 million for FY 2016 and \$92.1 million for FY 2017. These values are included in the  
23 revenue forecast component of the Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01, § 4.

1 The 4(h)(10)(C) credit for each of the 3,200 games is included in the net revenue provided to the  
2 ToolKit.

### 4 **2.6.2 System Augmentation Costs**

5 System augmentation costs for FY 2016–2017 are calculated using two different methods, one  
6 for the deterministic values provided to RAM2016 and a second for the variable costs included  
7 in the net revenues calculated in RevSim and provided to the ToolKit.

8  
9 For the rate period, the deterministic values provided to RAM2016 are calculated by multiplying  
10 the system augmentation amount (aMW) by the average AURORAxmp® price from the critical  
11 water run. The source of the system augmentation amounts is the Power Loads and Resource  
12 Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 4.2. A summary of this calculation is shown in Documentation  
13 Table 16.

14  
15 The system augmentation costs included in the net revenue provided to the ToolKit represent the  
16 uncertainty in the cost of system augmentation purchases not made prior to setting rates. The  
17 uncertainty in the cost of system augmentation considers electricity price risk associated with  
18 meeting that need. For each game, these variable cost values replace the deterministic values for  
19 system augmentation costs provided to RAM2016.

20  
21 To determine system augmentation cost risk, augmentation needs (aMW) are divided into two  
22 categories. The first category assumes that CGS is operating at the forecast level of output in a  
23 non-planned-outage year for the entire rate period. This category is referred to as system  
24 augmentation not needed due to CGS planned outages (Category 1). The second category of  
25 system augmentation need is the need to replace the CGS output during planned outages. This

1 category of system augmentation need is referred to as system augmentation need due to CGS  
2 planned outages (Category 2) and is relevant for only FY 2017 in this rate period.

3  
4 System augmentation not due to CGS planned outages is further divided into two categories.  
5 Fifty percent of the Category 1 augmentation is priced using the market price run, and the  
6 remaining 50 percent is priced using the critical water run. The entire amount of system  
7 augmentation due to CGS planned outages is priced at market prices from the market price run.

8  
9 For FY 2016, a year without a planned CGS outage, all system augmentation would be classified  
10 as Category 1 augmentation need, 50 percent of which is met with purchases at market prices  
11 and the remaining 50 percent at prices from the critical water run. For FY 2017, a year with a  
12 planned CGS outage, the total system augmentation need is made up of both Category 1 and  
13 Category 2 augmentation needs. Fifty percent of the Category 1 augmentation need is met with  
14 purchases at prices from the critical water run, and the remaining 50 percent of the Category 1  
15 augmentation need and all the Category 2 augmentation need are met at prices from the market  
16 price run.

17  
18 RevSim calculates the total system augmentation cost risk associated with each of the  
19 3,200 games per fiscal year by summing the system augmentation costs computed by these two  
20 approaches. Documentation Table 17 presents sample calculations based on the methodology  
21 used to calculate system augmentation cost risk in RevSim for FY 2016–2017.

### 22 23 **2.6.3 Secondary Energy Sales/Revenues and Balancing Power Purchases/Expenses**

24 RevSim calculates secondary energy sales and revenues under various load, resource, and market  
25 price conditions. A key attribute of RevSim is that each month is divided into two time periods,

1 Heavy Load Hours and Light Load Hours. For each simulation, RevSim calculates Power  
2 Services' HLH and LLH load and resource conditions and determines HLH and LLH secondary  
3 energy sales and balancing power purchases. Included in this calculation are the additional  
4 amounts of secondary energy that result from the forward power purchases of 22 aMW in  
5 FY 2016 and 100 aMW in FY 2017 that were acquired to provide SE Idaho Load Service (SILS)  
6 once the BPA-PacifiCorp Exchange Agreement terminates. While the SILS loads are included  
7 in the loads and the calculation of system augmentation in the Power Loads and Resources  
8 Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, the amounts of these forward power purchases are not included. Once  
9 the amounts of the forward power purchases are used to serve the SILS loads, the amounts of  
10 secondary energy marketable at Mid-C increase due to the reductions in firm load obligations  
11 associated with SILS. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03, § 3.1.4  
12 regarding the treatment of SILS forward power purchases and Power Loads and Resources  
13 Study, BP-16-E-BPA-03A, Tables 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, lines 4-6, and Tables 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3,  
14 line 6 where the SILS loads are embedded in the total load values.

15  
16 Transmission losses on BPA's transmission system are incorporated into RevSim by reducing  
17 Federal hydro generation, CGS output, and wind generation that BPA has under contract by  
18 2.97 percent. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-16-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.5.

19  
20 Electricity prices estimated by AURORAxmp® from the market price run are applied to the  
21 secondary energy sales and balancing power purchase amounts to determine secondary energy  
22 revenues and balancing power purchases expenses. These HLH and LLH revenues and expenses  
23 are then combined with other revenues and expenses to calculate PS operating net revenues.

1 **2.6.4 Median Net Secondary Revenue Computations**

2 Secondary energy revenues and balancing power purchases expenses for FY 2016–2017 are  
3 provided to RAM2016. These revenues and expenses are based on the median net secondary  
4 revenues (secondary energy revenues less balancing power purchases expenses) from the 3,200  
5 games. The secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases passed to RAM2016, both  
6 measured in annual average megawatts, are the arithmetic means of these quantities over the  
7 3,200 games for each fiscal year.

8  
9 In a data set with an even number of values, the median value is the mean of the two middle  
10 values. Because these two middle games have specific qualities (*i.e.*, loads, resources, prices,  
11 and monthly shape) that may not be representative of the study as a whole, the mean of more  
12 than two middle games was used to smooth out any particular features of individual games. To  
13 avoid specific games distorting the results, the mean of 320 games was used. The values for  
14 secondary energy sales revenues and balancing power purchases expenses passed to RAM2016  
15 are the arithmetic means of the secondary energy sales revenues and balancing power purchases  
16 expenses (calculated and reported separately to RAM2016) for the 320 middle games as  
17 measured by net secondary revenue (160 above the median net secondary revenue and  
18 160 below). Documentation Tables 18 and 19 provide summary calculations of the secondary  
19 energy sales revenues and balancing power purchase expenses provided to RAM2016 for  
20 FY 2016–2017. Documentation Tables 20 and 21 provide monthly values for the secondary  
21 energy sales/revenues and total power purchases/expenses provided to RAM2016 for FY 2016–  
22 2017. annual secondary energy sales/revenues and total power purchases/expenses for FY 2016–  
23 2017 (based on the median approach described above) are reported in Documentation Table 22.  
24 The secondary energy revenues are \$337.8M for FY 2016 and \$377.2M for FY 2017. The total  
25 power purchases expenses are \$29.6M for FY 2016 and \$53.3M for FY 2017.

1 **2.6.5 Net Revenue**

2 RevSim results are used in an iterative process with ToolKit and RAM2016 to calculate PNRR  
3 and, ultimately, rates that provide BPA with a 95 percent TPP for the two-year rate period. The  
4 PS net revenue simulated in each RevSim run depends on the revenue components developed by  
5 RAM2016, which in turn depend on the level of PNRR assumed when RAM2016 is run.  
6 RevSim simulates intermediate sets of net revenue during this iterative process. The final set of  
7 PS net revenue from RevSim is the set that yields a 95 percent TPP without requiring additional  
8 PNRR.

9  
10 Using 3,200 games of net revenue risk data simulated by RevSim and NORM and mathematical  
11 descriptions of the CRAC and DDC, the ToolKit produces 3,200 games of cash flow and annual  
12 ending reserve levels. From these games, the ToolKit calculates TPP, and then analysts can  
13 change the amounts of PNRR in order to achieve TPP targets.

14  
15 A statistical summary of the annual net revenue for FY 2016–2017 simulated by RevSim using  
16 rates with \$0 million in PNRR is reported in Table 5. PS net revenue over the rate period  
17 averages \$2.5 million/year. This amount represents only the operating net revenues calculated in  
18 RevSim. It does not reflect additional net revenue adjustments in the ToolKit model due to the  
19 output from NORM, interest earned on financial reserves, or impacts of the CRAC and DDC.  
20 The average net revenue in Table 5 will differ from the net revenue shown in the Power Revenue  
21 Requirement Study, BP-16-E-BPA-02, Table 1, which shows the results of a deterministic  
22 forecast that does not account for system augmentation risk and uses median, rather than  
23 average, net secondary revenues.

## 2.7 Inputs to NORM

The primary source of risk estimates in NORM is the judgment of subject matter experts who have the most knowledge of how the expenses, and occasionally the revenue, associated with the sources of uncertainty might vary from the forecasts embedded in the baseline assumptions used in rate development. When available, historical data are used in the modeling of risks in NORM.

### 2.7.1 CGS Operations and Maintenance (O&M)

CGS O&M uncertainty is modeled for Base O&M and Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) Insurance Premiums. NORM captures uncertainty around Base O&M and NEIL insurance costs. For Base O&M, NORM distributes the minimum- and maximum-based subject matter expert estimation of deviations from the expected value. The revenue requirement amounts for CGS O&M for FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017 are \$331 million, \$263 million, and \$322 million, respectively. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels. For FY 2015, NORM models the maximum O&M expense as 2.5 percent greater than forecast and the minimum as 2.5 percent less than forecast. For FY 2016 and FY 2017, the maximums are 6 percent greater than forecast, and the minimums are 4 percent less than forecast.

For NEIL insurance premiums, risk is modeled around forecast gross premiums and distributions based on the level of earnings on the NEIL fund. Historically, member utilities have received annual distributions based on the level of these earnings; the net premiums they pay are lower as a result. During FY 2015–2017 BPA anticipates that the NEIL Premiums, will be lower than the forecast values of \$3.5 million in each year. NEIL premiums are modeled using a Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) distribution. A PERT distribution is a type of beta distribution for which minimum, most likely, and maximum values are specified. For FY 2015, the low, base, and high are set to \$2 million, \$2.2 million, and \$2.5 million respectively. For

1 FY 2016, the parameters are set to \$2 million, \$2.5 million, and \$3 million. For FY 2017, the  
2 parameters are set to \$2 million, \$2.5 million, and \$3.5 million.

3  
4 The distributions for CGS O&M are shown in Documentation Figure 14.

### 6 **2.7.2 Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation O&M**

7 For Corps and Reclamation O&M, NORM models uncertainty around the following:

- 8 (a) Additional costs if a security event occurs or if the security threat level increases
- 9 (b) Additional costs if a fish event occurs
- 10 (c) Additional extraordinary maintenance
- 11 (d) Additional costs due to a catastrophic event
- 12 (e) Additional costs due to new system requirements

13  
14 For additional security costs, NORM assumes for FY 2015 through FY 2017 that there is a  
15 2 percent probability that an event will occur that leads to a requirement for additional security at  
16 the Corps and Reclamation facilities. The additional annual cost if an event were to occur is the  
17 same for both the Corps and Reclamation at \$3 million each.

18  
19 Additional fish environmental costs are modeled similarly, with a 2 percent probability that an  
20 event that requires additional annual expenditures of \$2 million each for both the Corps and  
21 Reclamation will occur in FY 2015 through FY 2017.

22  
23 For additional hydro system needs, NORM models the uncertainty that additional repair and  
24 maintenance costs at the Federal hydro projects could be incurred and the probability that an  
25 outage event could occur. For FY 2015 through FY 2017, this risk is modeled with a 2.5 percent



1 probability that an event will occur that leads to an additional \$5 million expense. This risk is  
2 modeled in the same way for both the Corps and Reclamation.

3  
4 NORM models the expense cost of a catastrophic, system-wide event. This risk is modeled for  
5 FY 2015 through FY 2017 with a \$30 million cost and an annual probability of 1 percent. This  
6 risk is modeled in the same way for both the Corps and Reclamation.

7  
8 NORM models the expense cost related to increased compliance or regulatory requirements.  
9 This risk is modeled for FY 2015 through FY 2017 with a \$5 million cost and an annual  
10 probability of 10 percent. This risk is modeled in the same way for both the Corps and  
11 Reclamation.

12  
13 The distributions for total Corps and Reclamation O&M are shown in Documentation Figure 15.

### 14 15 **2.7.3 Conservation Expense**

16 For this expense item, NORM models uncertainty around Conservation Acquisition and Low-  
17 Income and Tribal Weatherization. Conservation acquisition expense is modeled for each year  
18 from FY 2015 through FY 2017 using a PERT distribution. Conservation acquisition expense is  
19 modeled with a minimum value of 90 percent of the amount in the revenue requirement, a most  
20 likely value equal to the amount, and a maximum value of 105 percent of the amount. The  
21 amount for FY 2015 for conservation acquisition expense is \$14.7 million. The forecasts are  
22 \$14.6 million and \$14.6 million in FY 2016 and FY 2017, respectively. *See* Power Revenue  
23 Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program  
24 Spending Levels Table. The distribution for conservation acquisition is shown in  
25 Documentation Figure 16.

1 Low-income and tribal weatherization expense variability is modeled using a PERT distribution  
2 for FY 2015 through FY 2017. These expenses are modeled with a minimum value of  
3 95 percent of the amount in the revenue requirement, a most-likely value equal to the amount,  
4 and a maximum value of 105 percent of the amount. The amount for FY 2015 is \$5.2 million.  
5 The forecasts are \$5.3 million and \$5.4 million in FY 2016 and FY 2017, respectively. *See*  
6 *Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power*  
7 *Services Program Spending Levels Table.*

#### 9 **2.7.4 Spokane Settlement**

10 Within the BP-16 rate period, legislation enacting a settlement with the Spokane Tribe, similar to  
11 the settlement with the Colville Tribes, could pass. For FY 2016 and FY 2017, the payment to  
12 the Spokane Tribe would equal 25 percent of the payments made to the Colville Tribes. This  
13 payment amount is calculated from the forecast payments to the Colville Tribes of \$21.8 million  
14 in FY 2016 and \$22.2 million FY 2017. *See Power Revenue Requirement Study*  
15 *Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels Table.*

16  
17 NORM includes an assumption of a 20 percent probability that the legislation will pass during  
18 the rate period, with an equal probability that payments would begin in FY 2016 or FY 2017.  
19 The distributions for Spokane Settlement payments are shown in Documentation Figure 17.

#### 21 **2.7.5 Power Services Transmission Acquisition and Ancillary Services**

22 For this cost item, NORM models uncertainty around Third-Party General Transfer Agreement  
23 (GTA) Wheeling and Third-Party Transmission and Ancillary Services expenses. NORM  
24 models third-party GTA wheeling cost for each year from FY 2015 through FY 2017 with PERT  
25 distributions. For FY 2015, the minimum is set to 98 percent of the revenue requirement

1 amount, the most-likely value is set to the revenue requirement amount, and the maximum is set  
2 to 101 percent of the revenue requirement amount. For FY 2016, the minimum, most-likely, and  
3 maximum are set to 96 percent, 100 percent, and 102 percent of the revenue requirement  
4 amounts. For FY 2017, the minimum, most-likely, and maximum are set to 94 percent, 100  
5 percent, and 103 percent of the revenue requirement amounts. The forecast for FY 2015 for  
6 third-party GTA wheeling is \$6.4 million. The revenue requirement amounts are \$61.4 million  
7 in FY 2016 and \$71.0 million in FY 2017. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study  
8 Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels Table.  
9 Figure 18 of the Documentation shows the distribution for third-party GTA wheeling.

10  
11 The cost of third-party transmission and ancillary services is modeled for FY 2015 through  
12 FY 2017 using a PERT distribution with minimum and most likely values set to the revenue  
13 requirement amount. For FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017, the maximums are set to  
14 105 percent, 110 percent, and 116 percent of the revenue requirement amount. The amount in  
15 the revenue requirement for FY 2015 for third-party transmission and ancillary services is  
16 \$2.9 million. The amounts in the revenue requirement are \$2.4 million for each of FY 2016 and  
17 FY 2017. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A,  
18 Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels Table.

### 20 **2.7.6 Power Services Internal Operations Expenses**

21 For this item, NORM models uncertainty around the following expenses:

- 22 (a) PS System Operations
- 23 (b) PS Scheduling
- 24 (c) PS Marketing and Business Support
- 25 (d) PS allocation of Corporate G&A

1 PS Internal Operations Expenses are modeled in NORM for FY 2015 through FY 2017. The  
2 costs in the PS Internal Operations Expense categories primarily comprise of salaries. Risk in  
3 these categories is modeled based on the difference between staffing levels at the start of  
4 FY 2015 and the assumed staffing levels in the revenue requirement expense amounts for  
5 FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017. Growth in staffing levels from the start of FY 2015 through  
6 FY 2017 is modeled in NORM. The difference between the modeled staffing level and the  
7 revenue requirement staffing level is multiplied by cost of \$108 thousand per employee, to  
8 produce a change in PS Internal Operations Expense for each Fiscal Year. The revenue  
9 requirement amounts for Power Services Internal Operations Expenses for FY 2015, FY 2016,  
10 and FY 2017 are \$146.7 million, \$146.3 million, and \$150.5 million, respectively. *See* Power  
11 Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services  
12 Program Spending Levels Table.

13  
14 Figure 19 of the Documentation shows the distributions for total Internal Operations Costs,  
15 including Corporate G&A.

## 17 **2.7.7 Fish & Wildlife Expenses**

18 NORM models uncertainty around four categories of fish and wildlife mitigation program  
19 expense, as described below.

### 21 **2.7.7.1 BPA Direct Program Costs for Fish and Wildlife Expenses**

22 The costs of BPA's Direct Program for fish and wildlife are uncertain, in large part because the  
23 actual pace of implementation cannot be known, and there is a chance that program components  
24 will not be implemented as planned. This does not reflect any uncertainty in BPA's commitment  
25 to the plans; it is merely a realistic understanding that it can take time to start and implement

1 programs, and the expenses of the programs may not be incurred in the fiscal years in which  
2 BPA plans for them to be incurred. The uncertainty in fish and wildlife expenses is modeled  
3 using PERT distributions. For FY 2015, the minimum expense amount is set to 7.5 percent  
4 lower than the forecast amount, the most likely is set to 5 percent less than the forecast amount,  
5 and the maximum is set equal to the forecast amount. For FY 2016 and FY 2017, the minimums  
6 are set to 5 percent lower than the revenue requirement amount, the most likely values are set to  
7 2.5 percent lower than the revenue requirement amount, and the maximums are set equal to the  
8 revenue requirement amounts. The revenue requirement amounts for BPA's Direct Program for  
9 fish and wildlife for FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017 are \$260.0 million, \$267 million, and  
10 \$274 million, respectively. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-  
11 BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels Table. Figure 20 of this Study's  
12 Documentation illustrates the distributions for the BPA Direct Program expense.

#### 14 **2.7.7.2 U.S. Fish and Wildlife (USF&W) Service Lower Snake River Hatcheries Expenses**

15 Uncertainty in the expenses for the USF&W Service Lower Snake River Hatcheries is modeled  
16 as a PERT distribution with a minimum value set to 10 percent less than the forecast value, a  
17 most likely of 5 percent less than the forecast value, and a maximum equal to the forecast value.  
18 The revenue requirement amounts for USF&W Service Lower Snake River Hatcheries for  
19 FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017 are \$31.7 million, \$32.3 million, and \$32.9 million,  
20 respectively. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A,  
21 Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels Table. Figure 21 of the Documentation  
22 shows the distributions for risk over the Lower Snake River Hatcheries expense.

1 **2.7.7.3 Bureau of Reclamation Leavenworth Complex O&M Expenses**

2 NORM models uncertainty of the O&M expense of Reclamation’s Leavenworth Complex using  
3 a discrete risk model, with a 1 percent probability of incurring an additional \$1 million expense  
4 in each year. The revenue requirement amounts for Bureau of Reclamation Leavenworth  
5 Complex O&M for FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017 are included in the Bureau’s O&M budget,  
6 which is discussed in section 2.7.2 above. Documentation Figure 22 shows the distributions for  
7 Leavenworth Complex O&M expense.

8  
9 **2.7.7.4 Corps of Engineers Fish Passage Facilities Expenses**

10 NORM models uncertainty of the cost of the fish passage facilities for the Corps using a discrete  
11 risk model, with a 1 percent probability of incurring an additional \$1 million expense in each  
12 year. The revenue requirement amounts for Corps of Engineers Fish Passage Facilities Expenses  
13 for FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017 are included in the Corps’ O&M budget, which is discussed  
14 in section 2.7.2 above. Documentation Figure 23 shows the distributions for Fish Passage  
15 Facilities expense.

16  
17 **2.7.8 Interest Expense Risk**

18 NORM models the impact of interest rate uncertainty associated with new debt issuances during  
19 the forecast period and the resulting interest expense impact. For FY 2015 through FY 2017, the  
20 amount of planned new borrowing is \$565 million, \$792 million, and \$795 million respectively.  
21 *See Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 7A.* The  
22 planned borrowings and official forecast interest rates (Power Revenue Requirement Study  
23 Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, § 6) are used to calculate expected interest expense on  
24 long-term debt and appropriations for the revenue requirement. This analysis assesses the  
25 potential difference in interest expense on long-term debt and appropriations from the amount  
26 rates are set to recover in the revenue requirement.

1 In each Fiscal Year, planned new borrowings occur on a monthly basis for different amounts  
2 each month, with different term lengths. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study  
3 Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-02A, Table 7A. NORM models uncertainty in the interest rate  
4 BPA will eventually get when these borrowings occur. The analysis does not model uncertainty  
5 in the amount borrowed, term length of the borrowing, or timing of the borrowing.

6  
7 NORM uses a historical database of interest rates as the basis to forecast future uncertainty in  
8 interest rates. The database was generated from twenty years of historical daily data from 1994  
9 to 2014 that includes each interest rate term (for example one year, two year, ...thirty year). This  
10 historical data is captured for U.S. Agency interest rates, which are the rates BPA borrows at for  
11 Federal borrowings, and are also used for modeling uncertainty in the rates for Appropriations  
12 paid by BPA. The data source for these rates is Bloomberg Curve CO843. Historical data is also  
13 captured for taxable and tax-exempt interest rate indexes for AA-rated utilities. These are used  
14 as proxy rates for third-party financing related to Energy Northwest new capital and refinancing  
15 of existing Energy Northwest Debt. The data sources for these taxable and tax-exempt rates are  
16 Bloomberg Curve 903M and Bloomberg Curve 520M, respectively.

17  
18 To model the interest expense uncertainty in NORM, for each game, a starting date from the  
19 historical data set is selected and, for that date, the interest rate for each term length on the yield  
20 curve is captured. Then, the interest rates are captured for each term length on the yield curve  
21 30 days later. This process is repeated for three years and one month following the starting date,  
22 so that 37 interest rate data points for each term length are captured. This process is performed  
23 for Agency interest rates, AA Utility Taxable rates, and AA Utility Tax-Exempt interest rates.

1 BPA measures the monthly returns by taking the log return, also known as geometric return,  
2 which is the natural logarithm of the interest rate from one month less the natural logarithm of  
3 the interest rate of the prior month. This is very similar to taking the percentage change, known  
4 as the simple return. The log return approach is preferred because it is more accurate calculating  
5 small returns, which are more common when the time difference between returns is shorter (for  
6 example when the time difference is monthly, as in this analysis, versus annually). Also, the log  
7 returns possess the convenient mathematical property that they are additive through time whereas  
8 simple returns are not. Monthly returns are calculated for each interest rate product (Agency and  
9 AA Taxable), for each term length of that product, and for each thirty day period for a full three  
10 years from the sample starting date. BPA uses the 3200 calculated monthly returns to create a  
11 3-year projections of interest rate, for each term length, and for each interest rate product, all of  
12 which start from BPA's official starting interest rates in FY 2015. For example, assume the  
13 sample starting date for game 1 is June 5, 2001. The interest rate for the Agency product, with a  
14 10- year term, in the first month of the 36 month projection is equal to the FY 2015 Agency  
15 10-year interest rate from the official forecast (3.54 percent, *id.*) multiplied by the calculated  
16 return from June 5, 2001, to July 5, 2001 (June 5, 2001 10-year Agency interest rate =  
17 6.02 percent, July 5, 2001 10-year Agency interest rate = 6.19 percent, the log return equals  
18 1.2094 percent (log(6.19) less log (6.02)). Taking the exponent of the log return yields  
19 (1.012168), the appropriate factor to multiply 3.54 percent to get a one month projection  
20 (3.583 percent) of the 10-year Agency interest rate for game 1. To generate the month 2  
21 projection of the 10-year Agency interest rate for game 1, BPA takes the calculated rate from  
22 month 1, 3.583 percent, and multiplies it by the sampled return from August 5, 2001, to July 5,  
23 2001. For the full projection, repeat the process for all 36 months, for each term length on the  
24 yield curve, and for each interest rate product. In the second game, a new sample starting date is



1 selected from the 20-year dataset, and the process is repeated, but representative of a different  
2 3-year historical window within the dataset.

3  
4 Using this methodology, 3,200 games are run, generating interest rate projections of each term  
5 length for each interest rate product. Once all 3200 projections are generated, they are adjusted  
6 so that the average interest rate for all 3200 runs aligns with the expected interest rate in BPA's  
7 official 2017 interest rate forecast. Thus, this analysis captures the possible uncertainty around  
8 the expected interest expense in the revenue requirement and does not assess the expected value  
9 itself. The generated interest rates are then combined with the corresponding timing and term  
10 length of anticipated monthly borrowings in the repayment study to generate 3,200 projections of  
11 interest expense and appropriations expense. The difference between the deterministic forecast  
12 and the gamed amount is calculated for each issuance. The distribution of variation in Federal  
13 debt service expense, non-Federal debt service expense, and appropriations expense is shown in  
14 Documentation Figure 24.

### 16 **2.7.9 CGS Refueling Outage Risk**

17 In the spring of 2015 and the spring of 2017, Energy Northwest plans to take CGS out of service  
18 for refueling and maintenance. There is uncertainty in the duration of these outages and thus  
19 uncertainty in the amount of replacement power BPA must purchase from the market or the  
20 amount of secondary energy available to be sold in the market.

21  
22 CGS outage duration risk is modeled as deviations from expected net revenue due to variability  
23 in the duration of the planned maintenance outages in FY 2015 and FY 2017. Increases or  
24 decreases in downtime of the CGS plant result in changes in megawatthours generated, which  
25 results in decreased or increased net revenue for Power Services in FY 2015 and FY 2017. This

1 revenue variability is a function of plant outage duration, monthly flat AURORAxmp® market  
2 prices, and monthly flat CGS energy amounts from RevSim.

3  
4 The outage duration for FY 2015 was modeled with a minimum of 42 days, a maximum of  
5 75 days, and a median of 54 days. For FY 2017, the minimum is 40 days, the maximum is  
6 75 days, and the median is 54 days. The probability distribution of the outage durations is shown  
7 in Documentation Figure 25.

8  
9 To calculate the impact of the outages on net revenue, 3,200 outage durations are simulated. The  
10 difference between the simulated duration from NORM and the deterministic duration assumed  
11 in RevSim is used to determine the number of additional days the plant is in or out of service in  
12 each month. These additional days in or out of service are then applied to the gamed CGS  
13 energy amounts from RevSim to calculate monthly megawatthour deviations. Monthly, flat  
14 AURORAxmp® prices (§ 2.4) are then multiplied by the gamed generation deviations and  
15 adjusted for Slice, resulting in a PS net revenue deviation. The distributions of revenue changes  
16 for FY 2015 and FY 2017 are shown in Documentation Figure 26.

#### 17 18 **2.7.10 Revenue from Sales of Variable Energy Resource Balancing Services (VERBS)**

19 In FY 2016 and FY 2017, Transmission Services (TVS) will provide VERBS to wind and other  
20 variable resource generators in BPA’s balancing authority area. TS will charge generators for  
21 VERBS based on the installed capacity of the variable energy resources. TS will obtain from PS  
22 up to 400 MW of *inc* balancing reserve capacity during the “spring” (April through July) and  
23 900 MW of *inc* balancing reserve capacity during the remainder of the year. TS will obtain from  
24 PS up to 900 MW of *dec* balancing reserve capacity across the entire year. TS will pay PS for

1 the balancing reserve capacity through the cost allocation set in the Generation Inputs  
2 Settlement. *See* Fisher and Fredrickson, BP-16-E-BPA-12, Appendix A, Attachment 3.

3  
4 TS will attempt to obtain up to an additional 500 MW of *inc* balancing reserve during the spring.  
5 TS will first attempt to obtain this service from PS before attempting to obtain the service from  
6 the market. The revenue forecast includes the assumption that TS will purchase an additional  
7 150 MW of *inc* balancing reserve from PS during the spring. NORM models the uncertainty in  
8 the amount of *inc* balancing reserve that TS will obtain from PS for the spring. The uncertainty  
9 in the amount supplied is modeled using a PERT distribution, with the most likely set at the  
10 550 MW forecast, the high set at 900 MW at the 5th percentile, and the low set at 400 MW at the  
11 100th percentile.

12  
13 The net revenue impact of an increase (decrease) in *inc* balancing reserve sales consists of an  
14 increase (decrease) in inter-business unit revenue, partially offset by a decrease (increase) in net  
15 secondary energy revenue due to de-optimization of the hydro system. The impact on net  
16 secondary revenue was calculated to be 22 percent of the sales amount In the settlement.

17  
18 In each of the 3200 games in NORM, an amount of spring *inc* balancing reserves is drawn. A  
19 net revenue impact is calculated by applying the selling price of 29 cents per kilowatt per day  
20 (*see* Fisher and Fredrickson, BP-16-E-BPA-12, Appendix A, Attachment 1) to the difference  
21 between the amount drawn and the deterministic forecast, then multiplying that value by  
22 78 percent (one minus the 22 percent secondary revenue impact percentage). The distributions  
23 of net revenue changes for FY 2016 and FY 2017 are shown in Documentation Figure 27.

1 **2.7.11 Lower Snake Spill Risk**

2 In each of the 3200 games in NORM, the Net Revenue effect of Lower Snake River spill  
3 uncertainty is modeled. The Power Loads and Resources Study assumes that in certain poor  
4 FY 2017 water conditions, fish would be barged past Lower Snake River dams. This assumption  
5 results in lower spill requirements in eight of the 80 water years.

6  
7 NORM models the effect on Net Revenue if barging does not occur and the Snake River dams  
8 continue to spill in those eight water years. To calculate this, NORM first takes the difference  
9 between monthly aMW generation under the barging assumption and the continued spill  
10 assumption for each of the 80 water years. *See* Documentation Table 23. These generation  
11 differences are then aligned with the 3,200 games of monthly prices from AURORAxmp® (*see*  
12 section 2.4) based on the water year for the AURORAxmp® price games. The 3,200 games of  
13 monthly generation differences, multiplied by the monthly prices, multiplied by the number of  
14 hours in each month, multiplied by the non-slice percentage, produces 3,200 games of FY 2017  
15 revenue deviations in NORM. The distribution of net revenue changes for FY 2017 is shown in  
16 Documentation Figure 28.

17  
18 **2.7.12 The Net Revenue-to-Cash (NRTC) Adjustment**

19 One of the inputs to the ToolKit (through NORM) is the NRTC Adjustment. Most of BPA's  
20 probabilistic modeling is based on impacts of various factors on net revenue. BPA's TPP  
21 standard is a measure of the probability of having enough cash to make payments to the  
22 Treasury. While cash flow and net revenue generally track each other closely, there can be  
23 significant differences in any year. For instance, the requirement to repay Federal borrowing  
24 over time is reflected in the accrual arena as depreciation of assets. Depreciation is an expense  
25 that reduces net revenue, but there is no cash inflow or outflow associated with depreciation.  
26 The same repayment requirement is reflected in the cash arena as cash payments to the Treasury

1 to reduce the principal balance on Federal bonds and appropriations. These cash payments are  
2 not reflected on income statements. Therefore, in translating a net revenue result to a cash flow  
3 result, the impact of depreciation must be removed, and the impact of cash principal payments  
4 must be added. The 3,200 NRTC adjustments calculated in NORM make the necessary changes  
5 to convert RevSim and NORM accrual results (net revenue results) into the equivalent cash  
6 flows so that ToolKit can calculate reserves values in each game and thus calculate TPP.

7  
8 The NRTC Adjustment is modeled probabilistically in NORM. NORM uses the deterministic  
9 NRTC Table, Table 6, as its starting point and includes 3,200 gamed adjustments for the Slice  
10 True-Up, based on the calculated deviations in those revenue and expense items in NORM that  
11 are subject to the True-Up.

## 12 13 **2.8 NORM Results**

14 The output of NORM is an Excel<sup>®</sup> file containing (1) the aggregate total net revenue deltas for  
15 all of the individual risks that are modeled, and (2) the associated NRTC adjustments for each  
16 game for FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017. Each run has 3,200 games. The ToolKit uses this  
17 file in its calculations of TPP. Summary statistics and distributions for each fiscal year are  
18 shown in Documentation Figure 29.

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### 3. QUANTITATIVE RISK MITIGATION

#### 3.1 Introduction

The preceding sections of this Study describe the risks that are modeled explicitly, with the output of NORM and RevSim quantitatively portraying the financial uncertainty faced by PS in each fiscal year. This section describes the tools used to mitigate these risks—PS Reserves, the Treasury Facility, PNRR, the CRAC, and the DDC—and how BPA evaluates the adequacy of this mitigation. Section 4 describes the risks that BPA has analyzed qualitatively, that is, logically rather than through modeling, and the measures for treating them.

The risk that is the primary subject of this Study is the possibility that BPA might not have sufficient cash on September 30, the last day of a fiscal year, to fully meet its obligation to the Treasury for that fiscal year. BPA’s TPP standard, described in section 1.1.1 above, defines a way to measure this risk (TPP) and a standard that reflects BPA’s tolerance for this risk (no more than a five percent probability of any deferrals in a two-year rate period). TPP and the ability of the rates to meet the TPP standard are measured in the ToolKit by applying the risk mitigation tools described in this section to the modeled financial risks described in the previous sections.

TPP is modeled in ToolKit using a Monte Carlo approach in which 3,200 separate iterations (or games) of financial results are generated. Each game covers three years: FY 2015 and the two years in the BP-16 rate period, FY 2016 and FY 2017. FY 2015 is simulated to reflect the uncertainty of the starting FY 2016 balance of PS reserves available for risk. In each game, a test is performed to see if BPA has sufficient reserves available for risk to make its Treasury payment during each year of the rate period. The TPP is the percentage of those 3,200 games in

1 which BPA makes its Treasury payment on time and in full in both years. The ToolKit is further  
2 described in section 3.3 below.

3  
4 A second risk can be called within-year liquidity risk—the risk that, at some time within a fiscal  
5 year, BPA will not have sufficient cash to meet its immediate financial obligations (whether to  
6 the Treasury or to other creditors), even if BPA might have enough cash later in that year. In  
7 each recent rate proceeding, a need for reserves for within-year liquidity (“liquidity reserves”)  
8 has been defined. This level is based on a determination of BPA’s total need for liquidity and a  
9 subsequent determination of how much of that need is properly attributed to Power Services.

## 10 11 **3.2 Risk Mitigation Tools**

### 12 **3.2.1 Liquidity**

13 Cash and cash equivalents provide liquidity. For this rate proceeding, BPA has two sources of  
14 liquidity: (1) Financial Reserves Available for Risk Attributed to PS (PS Reserves) and (2) the  
15 Treasury Facility. These liquidity sources mitigate financial risk by serving as a temporary  
16 source of cash for meeting financial obligations during years in which net revenue and the  
17 corresponding cash flow are lower than anticipated. In years of above-expected net revenue and  
18 cash flow, financial reserves will be replenished so they will be available in later years.

#### 19 20 **3.2.1.1 PS Reserves**

21 PS Reserves are the fundamental protection against the financial impacts of the uncertainty BPA  
22 faces in its financial reserves. For power ratesetting purposes, it is the Financial Reserves  
23 Available for Risk attributed to the generation function (PS reserves) that is considered when  
24 measuring TPP. Financial reserves available to the generation function include cash and  
25 investments (“Treasury Specials”) held by BPA in the Bonneville Fund at the Treasury plus any



1 deferred borrowing. Deferred borrowing refers to amounts of capital expenditures BPA has  
2 made that authorize borrowing from the Treasury when BPA has not yet completed the  
3 borrowing. Deferred borrowing amounts are converted to cash when needed by completing the  
4 borrowing.

5  
6 PS Reserves are not held in a PS-specific account. BPA has only one account, the Bonneville  
7 Fund, in which it maintains financial reserves. Staff in the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO's)  
8 organization "attribute" part of the BPA Fund balance to the generation function and part to the  
9 transmission function. Reserves attributed to Power do not belong to Power Services; they  
10 belong to BPA.

11  
12 As \$333 million of PS reserves are considered not to be available for risk, that amount is not  
13 included in the starting financial reserves or any other part of the TPP calculation. These  
14 "Reserves Not For Risk" are made up of five categories. First, PS reserves exclude \$75 million  
15 in funds BPA has received for previously unpaid receivables for sales into the California ISO  
16 and California PX markets during the energy crisis of 2000–2001. There remains a risk that  
17 BPA may be obligated to refund some amount for BPA's sales into these markets during the  
18 energy crisis as a result of ongoing litigation. Second, \$31 million of funds collected from  
19 customers under contracts that obligate BPA to perform energy efficiency-related upgrades to the  
20 customers' facilities are excluded. Third, \$205 million in customer Prepay funds, which are set  
21 aside for specific categories of Power capital projects, are excluded. Fourth, \$15 million in  
22 customer deposits for credit worthiness are excluded. These deposits are held in the BPA fund  
23 as collateral for open trades. Fifth, \$6 million for deposits received from third parties for cost-  
24 sharing of fish and wildlife projects are excluded.

1 **3.2.1.2 The Treasury Facility**

2 In FY 2008, BPA reached an agreement with the U.S. Treasury that made a \$300 million  
3 short-term note available to BPA for up to two years to pay expenses. BPA concluded that this  
4 note can be prudently relied on as a source of liquidity. In FY 2009, BPA and the Treasury  
5 agreed to expand this facility to \$750 million.  
6

7 The Treasury Facility is an Agency liquidity tool, managed by Corporate Finance. For actual  
8 use, the Treasury Facility is not allocated or earmarked for specific business lines or purposes.  
9 For the purpose of modeling risk for the BP-16 rate period, all \$750 million of the Treasury  
10 Facility is modeled to be available for PS risk. This allocation is made for TPP modeling  
11 purposes only.  
12

13 **3.2.1.3 Within-Year Liquidity Need**

14 BPA needs to maintain access to short-term liquidity for responding to within-year needs, such  
15 as uncertainty due to the unpredictable timing of cash receipts or cash payments, or known  
16 timing mismatches. An illustrative timing mismatch is the large Energy Northwest bond  
17 payment due in the spring. PF rates are set to recover the entire amount of this payment, but by  
18 spring BPA will have received only about half of the PF revenue that will fully recover this cost  
19 by the end of the fiscal year. A within-year liquidity need of \$320 million for PS was  
20 determined in the BP-14 rate proceeding. This assumption remains unchanged for BP-16.  
21

22 **3.2.1.4 Liquidity Reserves Level**

23 No PS Reserves need to be set aside for within-year liquidity; *i.e.*, the Liquidity Reserves Level  
24 is \$0. Thus, all PS Reserves are considered to be available for the year-to-year liquidity needed  
25 to support TPP.  
26

1 **3.2.1.5 Liquidity Borrowing Level**

2 For this Study, \$320 million of the short-term borrowing capability provided by the Treasury  
3 Facility is considered to be available only for within-year liquidity needs, fully meeting the need  
4 for short-term liquidity. Thus, \$430 million of the \$750 million Treasury Facility is considered  
5 to be available for year-to-year liquidity for TPP.  
6

7 **3.2.1.6 Net Reserves**

8 The concept of “Net Reserves” is used in this Study. Net Reserves simplifies the discussion of  
9 the above sources of liquidity by combining the two discrete sources into a single measure. Net  
10 Reserves is the amount of PS Reserves above zero, less any balance on the Treasury Facility. In  
11 each individual Monte Carlo game in the ToolKit, either PS Reserves are \$0 or higher and the  
12 balance on the Treasury Facility is \$0, or PS Reserves are \$0 and the balance on the Treasury  
13 Facility is \$0 or higher; in a single game, PS Reserves and the balance on the Treasury Facility  
14 will not both be above \$0. This is because the ToolKit models a positive outstanding balance on  
15 the Treasury Facility if and only if PS Reserves are depleted. This clear-cut relationship does not  
16 hold for expected values calculated from a set of multiple games: it is mathematically possible  
17 for the expected value of ending reserves attributed to PS to be above zero and for the expected  
18 value of the outstanding balance on the Treasury Facility to be above zero. Net Reserves, which  
19 represent balances on the Treasury Facility as a negative reserves balance, provides a more  
20 intuitive representation of the interaction between the PS Reserves and Treasury Facility  
21 Borrowing statistics.  
22

23 **3.2.2 Planned Net Revenues for Risk**

24 Analyses of BPA’s TPP are conducted during rate development using current projections of  
25 PS Reserves and other sources of liquidity. If the TPP is below the 95 percent two-year standard  
26 established in BPA’s Financial Plan, then the projected reserves, along with whatever other risk

1 mitigation is considered in the risk study, are not sufficient to reach the TPP standard. This is  
2 typically corrected by adding PNRR to the revenue requirement as a cost needing to be  
3 recovered by rates. This addition has the effect of increasing rates, which will increase net cash  
4 flow, which will increase the available PS Reserves and therefore increase TPP. No PNRR is  
5 needed to meet the TPP standard for the proposed rates; PNRR is \$0 for both FY 2016 and  
6 FY 2017.

7  
8 PNRR is calculated in the ToolKit, described in section 3.3 below. If the ToolKit calculates TPP  
9 below 95 percent, PNRR can be iteratively added to the model in one or both years of the rate  
10 period (typically, PNRR is evenly added to both years). PNRR is added in \$1 million increments  
11 until a 95 percent TPP is achieved. The calculated PNRR amounts are then provided to the  
12 Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-16-E-BPA-02, which calculates a new Revenue  
13 Requirement. This adjusted Revenue Requirement is then iterated through the rate models and  
14 tested again in ToolKit. If ToolKit reports TPP below 95 percent or TPP above 95 percent by  
15 more than the equivalent of \$1 million in PNRR, PNRR adjustments are calculated again and  
16 reiterated through the rate models.

### 17 18 **3.2.3 The Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause (CRAC)**

19 In most power rates in effect since 1993, BPA has employed CRACs or Interim Rate  
20 Adjustments (IRAs) as upward rate adjustment mechanisms that can respond to the financial  
21 circumstances BPA experiences before the next opportunity to adjust rates in a rate proceeding.  
22 The CRAC explained here could increase rates for FY 2016 based on financial results for  
23 FY 2015. It also could increase rates for FY 2017 based on the accumulation of financial results  
24 for FY 2015 and FY 2016 (taking into account any CRAC applying to FY 2016 rates). The rates  
25 subject to the CRAC (and eligible for the DDC, section 3.2.5 below) are the Non-Slice Customer

1 rate, the PF Melded rate, the IP rate, the NR rate, and the Reserves-based Ancillary and Control  
2 Area Services rates, which are levied by Transmission Services. *See* Power Rate Schedules,  
3 BP-16-E-BPA-09, GRSP II.C; Transmission Rate Schedules, BP-16-E-BPA-10, GRSP II.G.  
4

### 5 **3.2.3.1 Calibrated Net Revenue (CNR)**

6 CNR is Power Services' NR adjusted for certain debt management and contract-related  
7 transactions that affect the relationship between accruals and cash. The method for calculating  
8 CNR is described in GRSP II.C. Examples of the application of this method, including actions  
9 that change Federal depreciation, debt transactions that affect NR but not cash, and cash contract  
10 settlements, are described in the Documentation, Example 1.  
11

### 12 **3.2.3.2 Description of the CRAC**

13 The CRAC for FY 2016 and FY 2017 is an annual upward adjustment in various power and  
14 transmission rates. The threshold for triggering the CRAC is an amount of Power Services'  
15 CNR accumulated since the end of FY 2014.  
16

17 The Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue (ACNR) threshold values are set equivalent to \$0 in  
18 PS net reserves. The ACNR threshold for each year is calculated by taking the difference  
19 between average ACNR and average Net Reserves across all 3200 games in the ToolKit, and  
20 adding that difference to the target CRAC threshold in terms of reserves.  
21

22 As an example, assume that a given FY's CRAC threshold in terms of reserves is supposed to be  
23 \$0. If the average ACNR at the start of that FY is \$200 million and the average Net Reserves at  
24 the start of that FY is \$50 million, then the CRAC threshold in terms of ACNR for that year is  
25 \$150 million ( $\$0 + \$200 - \$50 = \$150$  million).

1 The CRAC will recover 100 percent of the first \$100 million that ACNR is below the threshold.  
2 Any amount beyond \$100 million will be collected at 50 percent, up to the CRAC annual limit  
3 on total collection, or cap, of \$300 million. For example, at an equivalent of negative  
4 \$100 million in reserves at the end of the fiscal year, \$100 million will be collected in the next  
5 year. At the equivalent of negative \$150 million, \$125 million will be collected (\$100 million  
6 plus one-half of the next \$50 million). The CRAC will be implemented only if the amount of the  
7 CRAC is greater than or equal to \$5 million.

8  
9 Calculations for the CRAC that could apply to FY 2016 rates will be made in July 2015; the  
10 corresponding calculations for possible adjustments to FY 2017 rates will be made in  
11 September 2016. A forecast of the year-end Power Services ACNR will be made based on the  
12 results of the Third Quarter Review and then compared to the thresholds for the CRAC and the  
13 DDC. See section 3.2.5 below. If the ACNR forecast is below the CRAC threshold, an upward  
14 rate adjustment will be calculated for the duration of the upcoming fiscal year. If the forecast is  
15 above the threshold for the DDC, a downward rate adjustment will be calculated to distribute  
16 dividends to applicable rates for the duration of the upcoming fiscal year. *See Table 7.*

### 17 18 **3.2.3.3 Administrator's Discretion to Reduce the CRAC**

19 BPA's CRAC methodology includes a process that allows BPA to look ahead to the remaining  
20 fiscal year(s) of the rate period and determine whether the calculated CRAC amount could be  
21 reduced without causing the PS TPP to fall short of BPA's TPP standard. The ability to apply  
22 discretion in the CRAC adjustment is tempered by the requirement to maintain the TPP standard  
23 for the remainder of the rate period and the requirement to restore liquidity tools, such as the  
24 Treasury Facility, if used. This requirement protects the TPP standard but provides for lower

1 rates if BPA determines that not all of the additional revenue is needed to meet the TPP standard  
2 or to restore liquidity tools.

3  
4 A CRAC that is calculated for FY 2016 may be reduced from the calculated amount as long as  
5 the two-year TPP for FY 2016–2017 remains at or above 95 percent. BPA may adjust the  
6 parameters (*i.e.*, the Cap and Threshold) for the CRAC applicable to FY 2017 to maintain the  
7 FY 2016–2017 TPP. A CRAC that is calculated for FY 2017 may be reduced from the  
8 calculated amount as long as the one-year TPP for FY 2017 would still be at or above  
9 97.5 percent. These reductions may not be made if they would reduce the generation of  
10 incremental revenue intended to allow repayment of any borrowing under the Treasury Facility.  
11 Because the CRAC thresholds have been set at the lowest level that allows for beginning prompt  
12 replenishment of liquidity tools if used, any reduction in CRAC amounts would compromise  
13 liquidity replenishment; therefore, there is effectively no Administrator’s discretion for the  
14 CRACs that could apply to rates in FY 2016 or FY 2017.

#### 15 16 **3.2.4 The NFB Adjustment**

17 NFB (NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service] FCRPS [Federal Columbia River Power  
18 System] BiOp [Biological Opinion]) risks arise from litigation over the FCRPS BiOp. NFB risks  
19 and mitigation are addressed through qualitative risk assessment and mitigation. *See* section 4.2  
20 below.

#### 21 22 **3.2.5 Dividend Distribution Clause (DDC)**

23 One of BPA’s financial policy objectives is to ensure that reserves do not accumulate to  
24 excessive levels. *See* section 1.2.1 above. The DDC is triggered if Power Services’ ACNR is  
25 above a threshold (instead of below, as with the CRAC), and provides a downward adjustment

1 to the same power and transmission rates that are subject to the CRAC. In the same way that a  
2 CRAC passes costs of bad financial outcomes to BPA’s customers, a DDC passes benefits of  
3 good financial outcomes to BPA’s customers. The total distribution is capped at \$1,000 million  
4 per fiscal year. The DDC will be implemented only if the amount of the DDC is greater than or  
5 equal to \$5 million. *See* Table 8.

### 6 7 **3.3 Overview of the ToolKit**

8 The ToolKit is an Excel<sup>®</sup> 2003 spreadsheet that is used to evaluate the ability of PS to meet  
9 BPA’s TPP standard, given the net revenue variability embodied in the distributions of operating  
10 and non-operating risks. The ToolKit contains several parameters (*e.g.*, Starting Reserves and  
11 CRAC and DDC settings) defined within the ToolKit file itself. The ToolKit reads in data from  
12 two external files, one each from RevSim and NORM. Most of the modeling of risks are  
13 performed by the Operating Risk Models and NORM, as described in sections 2 and 3 of this  
14 Study. Most of the logic for simulating the financial results in the years included in a ToolKit  
15 analysis is in VBA code (Microsoft’s *Visual Basic* for Applications).

16  
17 The ToolKit is used to assess the effects of various policies, assumptions, changes in data, and  
18 risk mitigation measures on the level of year-end reserves and liquidity attributable to Power  
19 Services, and thus on TPP. It registers a deferral of a Treasury payment when reserves and all  
20 sources of liquidity are exhausted in any given year. The ToolKit is run for 3,200 games or  
21 iterations. TPP is calculated by dividing the number of games where a deferral did not occur in  
22 either year of the rate period by 3,200. The ToolKit calculates the TPP and other risk statistics  
23 and reports results. The ToolKit also allows analysts to calculate how much PNRR is needed in  
24 rates, if any, to meet the TPP standard. The “Main” page of the ToolKit is shown in  
25 Documentation Figure 30.



1 **3.4 ToolKit Inputs and Assumptions**

2 **3.4.1 RevSim Results**

3 The ToolKit reads in risk distributions generated by RevSim that are created for the current year,  
4 FY 2015, and the rate period, FY 2016–2017. TPP is measured for only the two-year rate  
5 period, but the starting Reserves Available for Risk for FY 2016 depend on events yet to unfold  
6 in FY 2015; these runs reflect that FY 2015 uncertainty. See section 2 of this Study for more  
7 detail on Operating Risk Models.

8  
9 **3.4.2 Non-Operating Risk Model**

10 The ToolKit reads in NORM distributions that are created for FY 2015–2017, which reflect the  
11 uncertainty around non-operating expenses. See section 2 of this Study for more detail on  
12 NORM.

13  
14 **3.4.3 Treatment of Treasury Deferrals**

15 In the event of a deferral of payment of principal to the Treasury in the ToolKit, the ToolKit  
16 assumes that BPA will track the balance of payments that have been deferred and will repay this  
17 balance to the Treasury at its first opportunity. “First opportunity” is defined for TPP  
18 calculations as the first time Power Services ends a fiscal year with more than \$100 million in  
19 net reserves. The same applies to subsequent fiscal years if the repayment cannot be completed  
20 in the first year after the deferral. This is referred to as “hybrid” logic on the ToolKit main page.

21  
22 **3.4.4 Starting PS Reserves**

23 The FY 2015 starting PS reserves have a known value of \$273.1 million based upon the FY 2014  
24 Fourth Quarter Review. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this value. See section 3.2.1.1  
25 above for a description of PS Reserves.

1 **3.4.5 Starting ACNR**

2 The FY 2015 starting ACNR value of \$0 million is known from the definition of ANCR as being  
3 accumulated PS net revenue since the end of FY 2014. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this  
4 value.

5  
6 **3.4.6 PS Liquidity Reserves Level**

7 The PS Liquidity Reserves Level is an amount of PS Reserves set aside (*i.e.*, not available for  
8 TPP use) to provide liquidity for within-year cash flow needs. This amount is set to \$0 million.  
9 *See* section 3.2.1.4 above.

10  
11 **3.4.7 Treasury Facility**

12 This Study relies on all \$750 million of BPA’s Treasury Facility: \$320 million for within-year  
13 liquidity needs, as described in section 3.2.1.5 above, and the remaining \$420 million to support  
14 PS TPP.

15  
16 **3.4.8 Interest Rate Earned on Reserves**

17 Interest earned on the both the cash component and the Treasury Specials component of  
18 PS Reserves is 1.1 percent in FY 2015, 1.6 percent in FY 2016, and 2.8 percent in FY 2017.  
19 Interest paid on use of the Treasury Facility is 0.67 percent, 2.29 percent, and 3.77 percent for  
20 those three fiscal years.

21  
22 **3.4.9 Interest Credit Assumed in Net Revenue**

23 An important feature of the ToolKit is the ability to calculate interest earned on PS reserves  
24 separately for each game. The net revenue games the ToolKit reads in from RevSim include  
25 deterministic assumptions of interest earned on reserves for each fiscal year; that is, the interest

1 earned does not vary from game to game. To capture the risk impacts of variability in interest  
2 credit induced by variability in the level of reserves, in the TPP calculations the values embedded  
3 in the RevSim results for interest earned on reserves are backed out of all ToolKit games and  
4 replaced with game-specific calculations of interest credit. The interest credit assumptions  
5 embedded in RevSim results that are backed out are \$6.6 million for FY 2015, \$9.1 million for  
6 FY 2016, and \$16.6 million for FY 2017.

#### 8 **3.4.10 The Cash Timing Adjustment**

9 The cash timing adjustment reflects the interest credit impact of the non-linear shape of PS  
10 Reserves throughout a fiscal year as well as the interest earned on reserves attributed to PS that  
11 are not available for risk and not modeled in the ToolKit. The ToolKit calculates interest earned  
12 on reserves by making the simplifying assumption that reserves change linearly from the  
13 beginning of the year to the end. It takes the average of the starting reserves and the ending  
14 reserves and multiplies that figure by the interest rate for that year. Because PS cash payments to  
15 the Treasury are not evenly spread throughout the year, but instead are heaviest in September, PS  
16 will typically earn more interest in BPA's monthly calculations than the straight-line method  
17 yields. Additionally, the ToolKit does not model Reserves Not For Risk (*see* section 3.2.1.1,  
18 above), nor the interest earned from these. The cash timing adjustment is a number from the  
19 repayment study that approximates this additional interest credit earned on reserves throughout  
20 the fiscal year along with the interest earned on reserves attributed to PS that are not available for  
21 risk. The cash timing adjustments for this Study are \$3.7 million for FY 2015, \$4.7 million for  
22 FY 2016, and \$8.2 million for FY 2017.

1 **3.4.11 Cash Lag for PNRR**

2 These numbers appear in the input section of the ToolKit’s main page, but they are calculated  
3 automatically. When the ToolKit calculates a change in PNRR (either a decrease, or more  
4 typically, an increase), it calculates how much of the cash generated by the increased rates would  
5 be received in the subsequent year, because September revenue is not received until October. In  
6 order to treat ToolKit-generated changes in the level of PNRR on the same basis as amounts of  
7 PNRR that have already been assumed in previous iterations of rate calculations and are already  
8 embedded in the RevSim results, the ToolKit calculates the same kind of lag for PNRR that is  
9 embedded in the RevSim output file the ToolKit reads. Because this Study does not require  
10 PNRR, there are no cash adjustments for PNRR.

11  
12 **3.5 Quantitative Risk Mitigation Results**

13 Summary statistics are shown in Table 9.

14  
15 **3.5.1 TPP**

16 The two-year TPP is 99.91 percent. In 3,200 games, there are no deferrals for FY 2015 or  
17 FY 2016. There are 3 deferrals for FY 2017, with the expected value of the amount deferred  
18 equal to \$0.016 million. The mean size of deferrals when they occur is \$17.1 million.

19  
20 **3.5.2 Ending PS Reserves**

21 Known starting PS Reserves for FY 2015 are \$273.1 million. The expected values of ending net  
22 reserves are \$378 million for FY 2015, \$411 million for FY 2016, and \$367 million for FY 2017.  
23 Over 3,200 games, the range of ending FY 2017 net reserves is from negative \$430 million to  
24 \$1,302 million. The rate adjustment mechanisms would produce a CRAC of \$265 million or a  
25 DDC of \$552 million in these extreme cases if the FY 2018 rates include mechanisms

1 comparable to those included in the FY 2016–2017 rates. The 50 percent confidence interval for  
2 ending net reserves for FY 2017 is \$121 million to \$610 million. ToolKit summary statistics for  
3 reserves and liquidity are in Documentation Figure 31 and Table 24.

### 4 5 6 **3.5.3 CRAC and DDC**

7 The CRAC triggers in 86 of the 3,200 games (3 percent of the time) for FY 2016, yielding an  
8 expected value of \$0.95 million in CRAC revenue in that year. The average size of the CRAC  
9 when it occurs is \$35.5 million. For FY 2017, the CRAC triggers 128 times (4 percent), yielding  
10 an expected value of \$3.0 million of CRAC revenue in that year, with an average CRAC size of  
11 \$75.1 million when the CRAC does occur.

12  
13 The DDC triggers in 15 of the 3,200 games (0.5 percent of the time) for FY 2016, yielding an  
14 expected value of \$0.13 million in distributions in that year. The average size of the distributions  
15 when the DDC does trigger is \$28.1 million. For FY 2017, the DDC triggers 256 times  
16 (8 percent), yielding an expected value of \$8.4 million in distributions in that year, with an  
17 average distribution size of \$105.2 million when the DDC does trigger.

18  
19 The thresholds and caps for the CRAC and DDC applicable to rates for FY 2016 and FY 2017  
20 are shown in Tables 7 and Table 8.

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## 4. QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION

### 4.1 Introduction

The qualitative risk assessment described here is a logical analysis of the potential impacts of risks that have been identified (but not included in the quantitative risk assessment), given the risk mitigation measures that have been created, which are largely terms and conditions that define how possible risk events would be treated. If this logical analysis indicates that significant financial risk remains in spite of the risk mitigation measures, additional risk treatment might be necessary. The three categories of risk analyzed here are financial risks to BPA arising from legislation over the FCRPS Biological Opinion, financial risks to BPA or to Tier 1 costs arising from BPA's provision of service at Tier 2 rates, and financial risks to BPA or to Tier 1 costs arising from BPA's provision of Resource Support Services.

### 4.2 FCRPS Biological Opinion Risks

Certainty that BPA can cover its fish and wildlife program costs is an important objective. Because of pending and possible litigation over BPA's FCRPS fish and wildlife obligations, it is impossible to determine now with certainty the approach to fish recovery and the associated costs that BPA will be required to implement during the rate period, FY 2016–2017.

The possibilities for FY 2016–2017 are many and mostly unknowable at this time and, as a result, probabilities cannot be estimated for any particular scenario that might be created.

Because the uncertainty is open-ended, it is necessary to have an equally open-ended adjustment mechanism to ensure that BPA can fund its fish and wildlife obligations despite the uncertainty.

This Study includes two related features that help to mitigate the financial risk to BPA and its stakeholders caused by uncertainty over future fish and wildlife obligations under FCRPS BiOps

1 and their financial impacts. These are the NFB Adjustment and the Emergency NFB Surcharge,  
2 collectively referred to as the NFB Mechanisms. NFB stands for the National Marines Fisheries  
3 Service Federal Columbia River Power System Biological Opinion. Implementation details for  
4 the NFB Mechanisms are provided in Power Rate Schedules, BP-16-E-BPA-09, GRSP II.N.

5  
6 The NFB Mechanisms will take effect should certain events, called trigger events, occur. An  
7 NFB Trigger Event is one of the following events that results in changes to BPA’s FCRPS  
8 Endangered Species Act (ESA) obligations compared to those in the most recent Power rate final  
9 studies, *as modified*, prior to this Trigger Event:

- 10  
11 (1) A court order in *National Wildlife Federation vs. National Marine Fisheries*,  
12 CV 01-640-RE, or any other case filed regarding an FCRPS BiOp issued by  
13 NMFS (also known as NOAA Fisheries Service) or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife  
14 Service, or any appeal thereof (“Litigation”).  
15 (2) An agreement (whether or not approved by the Court) that results in the resolution  
16 of issues in, or the withdrawal of parties from, Litigation.  
17 (3) A new FCRPS BiOp.  
18 (4) A BPA commitment to implement Recovery Plans under the ESA that results in  
19 the resolution of issues in, or the withdrawal of parties from, Litigation.  
20 (5) Actions or measures ultimately required under the 2014 Supplemental FCRPS  
21 BiOp that differ from the 2014 Supplemental FCRPS BiOp implementation  
22 forecast in the rate case.  
23

24 The fish and wildlife operation or fish and wildlife program (or both) that BPA implements in a  
25 fiscal year (for example, FY 2015) may not be the same as that assumed in the rate proposal.



1 The “as modified” term used in the description of the NFB mechanisms means that BPA will  
2 first adjust for changes in operations due to non-trigger event reasons, as well as changes in  
3 operations due to prior NFB events to determine the baseline for calculating the financial effects  
4 of an NFB event.

5  
6 The NFB Mechanisms protect the financial viability of BPA and its financial resources from the  
7 potentially large impact of changes in the operation of the Columbia River hydro system or in  
8 fish and wildlife program costs that are directly related to FCRPS BiOps and litigation over  
9 BiOps (as specified above).

#### 10 11 **4.2.1 The NFB Adjustment**

12 The NFB Adjustment adjusts the CRAC for any year in the rate period if one or more NFB  
13 Trigger Events with financial effects occurred in the previous year (unless one or more  
14 Emergency NFB Surcharges in the previous year completely collected additional revenue equal  
15 to the financial effects). The adjustment allows the CRAC to collect more revenue under  
16 specific conditions. The NFB Adjustment could modify the CRAC Cap applicable to rates for  
17 FY 2016 or FY 2017. While the NFB Adjustment increases the revenue the CRAC can collect,  
18 it does not necessarily result in higher revenue collected. If the NFB Adjustment triggers but  
19 Power Services’ ACNR is above the CRAC threshold specified in the GRSPs, there will be no  
20 adjustment to rates, because the CRAC will not trigger. It is possible to have a trigger event  
21 which does not reduce Net Revenue; these events do not trigger NFB Adjustments or Emergency  
22 NFB Surcharges.

1 **4.2.2 The Emergency NFB Surcharge**

2 The Emergency NFB Surcharge results in nearly immediate increases in net revenue for PS if  
3 (a) an NFB Trigger Event occurs, and (b) BPA is in a “Cash Crunch” and cannot prudently wait  
4 until the next year to collect incremental net revenue. A Cash Crunch is defined to exist when  
5 BPA calculates that the within-year Agency TPP (*i.e.*, including both TS and PS) is below  
6 80 percent. The surcharge increases net revenue by making an upward adjustment to power and  
7 transmission rates as specified in Power Rate Schedules, BP-16-E-BPA-09, GRSP II.N.

8  
9 The Emergency NFB Surcharge addresses the fact that the CRAC does not produce revenue until  
10 the year following the fiscal year in which financial effects of a Trigger Event are experienced.  
11 Thus, the financial benefit of the NFB Adjustment may be too late if BPA is in a Cash Crunch  
12 when a Trigger Event occurs. The surcharge may be implemented in FY 2016 if the events  
13 required to impose the surcharge occur in that fiscal year, or in FY 2017 if the requisite events  
14 occur in that year.

15  
16 **4.2.3 Multiple NFB Trigger Events**

17 There can be multiple NFB Trigger Events in one year. If BPA is not in a Cash Crunch in such a  
18 year, then there will be only one final analysis near the end of the year that calculates the NFB  
19 Adjustment to the cap on the CRAC applicable to the next fiscal year. If BPA is in a Cash  
20 Crunch in such a year, there may be more than one Emergency NFB Surcharge calculated and  
21 applied during that year. For example, there could be more than one court order in FY 2016 that  
22 increases the financial impacts of operations in FY 2016. If BPA were in a Cash Crunch, there  
23 could be an Emergency NFB Surcharge calculated for each of the Trigger Events and applied  
24 during FY 2016. If BPA were not in a Cash Crunch in FY 2016, all of these triggering events  
25 would be included in the calculation of the single NFB Adjustment that would increase the cap  
26 on the CRAC applicable to FY 2017.

1 Each NFB Adjustment affects only one year. However, because the comparison used to  
2 calculate the NFB Adjustment is between the actual operation for fish and the operation assumed  
3 in the most recent final rate proposal (as modified prior by previously responded-to NFB  
4 Events), it is possible for a Trigger Event to affect operations for more than one year of the rate  
5 period. For example, a decision in FY 2015 may affect operations in both FY 2015 and  
6 FY 2016. The analysis of the total financial impact during FY 2015 for adjusting the cap on the  
7 CRAC applying to FY 2016 would be separate from the analysis of the total financial impact  
8 during FY 2016 for adjusting the cap on the CRAC applying to FY 2017 (or for implementing an  
9 Emergency NFB Surcharge during FY 2016). Increases in the financial impacts during FY 2017  
10 are not covered by the NFB Adjustment, because incorporating those increases through an NFB  
11 Adjustment would require a CRAC during FY 2016, and the rates for FY 2016 are not covered  
12 by this Study. However, financial impacts during FY 2017 are covered by the Emergency NFB  
13 Surcharge provisions applicable to FY 2017.

#### 14 15 **4.3 Risks Associated with Tier 2 Rate Design**

##### 16 **4.3.1 Introduction**

17 For the FY 2016–2017 rate period, there are four Tier 2 rate alternatives: the Tier 2 Short-Term,  
18 Tier 2 Load Growth, Tier 2 VR1-2014, and Tier 2 VR1-2016 rates. *See* Power Rates Study,  
19 BP-16-E-BPA-01, § 3.1.7. BPA has made all of the necessary power purchases to meet its load  
20 obligations at the Tier 2 rate for the rate period. BPA purchased three flat annual blocks of  
21 power from the market for delivery to BPA at the Mid-Columbia delivery point (Mid-C). *Id.*,  
22 § 3.1.7.3. Preventing risks associated with Tier 2 from increasing costs for Tier 1 or requiring  
23 increased mitigation for Tier 1 is one of the objectives guiding the development of the risk  
24 mitigation for the FY 2016–2017 rate period. *See* section 1.2.1 above.

1 **4.3.2 Identification and Analysis of Risks**

2 The qualitative assessment of risks associated with Tier 2 cost recovery identified several  
3 possible events that could pose a financial risk to either BPA or Tier 1 costs:

- 4
- 5 (a) The contracted-for power is not delivered to BPA.
  - 6 (b) A customer's Above-Rate Period High Water Mark load is lower than the  
7 amount forecast.
  - 8 (c) A customer's Above-RHWM load is higher than the amount forecast.
  - 9 (d) A customer does not pay for its Tier 2 service.
  - 10 (e) A customer's Above-RHWM load is lower than its take-or-pay VR1-2016 rate  
11 amounts.
- 12

13 The following sections describe the analysis of these risks, which determines whether there is  
14 any significant financial risk to BPA or Tier 1 costs.

15

16 **4.3.2.1 Risk: The Contracted-for Power Is Not Delivered to BPA**

17 BPA has executed three standard Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP) Schedule C contracts for  
18 purchases made to meet its load obligations under Tier 2 rates for the rate period. Under the  
19 WSPP Schedule C contracts, if a supplier fails to deliver power at Mid-C, the contract provides  
20 for liquidated damages to be paid by the supplier. The liquidated damages cover the cost of any  
21 replacement power purchased by BPA to the extent the cost of the replacement power exceeds  
22 the original purchase price.

23

24 If there is a disruption in the delivery from Mid-C to the BPA point of delivery due to a  
25 transmission event, BPA will supply replacement power and pass through the cost of the  
26 replacement power to the Tier 2 purchasers by means of a Transmission Curtailment

1 Management Service (TCMS) calculation. The Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-BPA-01, § 3.1.9.1,  
2 explains how the TCMS calculation is performed for service at Tier 2 rates. BPA will base the  
3 TCMS cost on the amount of megawatthours that was curtailed and the Powerdex (or its  
4 replacement) Mid-C hourly index for the hour the event occurred. Based upon BPA's past  
5 experiences, it is not anticipated that such disruptions would affect a substantial number of hours  
6 in a year. The market index is a fair, unbiased estimate of the cost of replacement power;  
7 therefore, there is no reason to believe that if such events occur in a fiscal year BPA would incur  
8 a net cost.

#### 9 10 **4.3.2.2 Risk: A Tier 2 Customer's Load is Lower than the Amount Forecast**

11 Each customer provided BPA an election regarding its intention to meet none, some, or all of its  
12 Above-RHWM load with Tier 2-priced power from BPA. Elections were made by September  
13 30, 2011, for FY 2016 and FY 2017. Using the Above-RHWM loads that were computed in the  
14 RHWM process, which concluded in October 2014, and the customers' elections, BPA has  
15 determined each customer's Above-RHWM load served at a Tier 2 rate for the BP-16 rate  
16 period. As noted in section 4.3.2.1 above, BPA has made contractual commitments to purchase  
17 power sufficient to supply the necessary quantity of power at Tier 2 rates.

18  
19 Even if the customer's actual load is lower than the BPA forecast, the terms of the customer's  
20 Contract High Water Mark (CHWM) contract obligate the customer to continue to pay the full  
21 cost of its purchases at the Tier 2 rates. This approach protects BPA and Tier 1 purchasers from  
22 financial impacts of this event. The customer's load reduction would free up some of the power  
23 BPA has contracted for, and BPA would remarket this power. BPA would return the value of  
24 the remarketed power to the customer by charging it less through the Load Shaping rate than it  
25 would otherwise have been charged. BPA would effectively credit the customer for the

1 unneeded power at the Load Shaping rate, which is an unbiased estimate of the market value of  
2 the power; thus, there would be no net cost to BPA.

3  
4 **4.3.2.3 Risk: A Tier 2 Customer's Load is Higher than the Amount Forecast**

5 This risk is the inverse of the previous risk. If a customer's load is higher than forecast by BPA  
6 and the customer's sources of power (the sum of the quantity of power at Tier 2 rates the  
7 customer committed to purchase, its Tier 1 power, and the amount of non-BPA power the  
8 customer committed to its load) are inadequate to meet its total retail load, BPA would obtain  
9 additional power from the market and charge the customer for this power at the Load Shaping  
10 rate. The Load Shaping rate is an unbiased estimate of the market cost of the power. The  
11 customer thus retains the primary obligation to pay for the additional power, and there would be  
12 no net cost to BPA.

13  
14 **4.3.2.4 Risk: A Customer Does Not Pay for its Service at the Tier 2 Rate**

15 It is not possible for a customer to be in default on its Tier 2 charges and remain in good standing  
16 for its Tier 1 service. If a customer does not pay for its service at the Tier 2 rate, it will be in  
17 arrears for its PS bill and will be subject to late payment charges. BPA may require additional  
18 forms of payment assurance if (1) BPA determines that the customer's retail rates and charges  
19 may not be adequate to provide revenue sufficient to enable the customer to make the payments  
20 required under the contract, or (2) BPA identifies in a letter to the customer that BPA has other  
21 reasonable grounds to conclude that the customer may not be able to make the payments required  
22 under the contract. If the customer does not provide payment assurance satisfactory to BPA,  
23 then BPA may terminate the CHWM contract.

1 **4.3.2.5 Risk: A Customer’s Above-RHWM Load is Lower than its Take-or-Pay Tier 2**  
2 **Amounts**

3 When customers subscribed to the Tier 2 VR1-2014 and Tier 2 VR1-2016 rates, they requested  
4 specific amounts of load to be served at these rates on a take-or-pay basis for the term of the rate  
5 alternative’s application. Customers were eligible for amounts that were capped at levels based  
6 on BPA load forecasts completed the previous spring. Once customers requested an amount,  
7 however, and BPA was successful purchasing that amount, then the customers became  
8 contractually committed to that purchase amount. Some customers elected, in accordance with  
9 section 10 of the CHWM contract, to have BPA remarket amounts of their purchases that are in  
10 excess of their Above-RHWM load. These customers will continue to pay the full cost of the  
11 purchases they elected. BPA will allocate some of this power to the Tier 2 Short-Term cost pool  
12 at a market price. The remainder will be purchased to meet a portion of BPA’s Tier 1  
13 augmentation need at the forecast Tier 1 augmentation prices. Because BPA is selling the excess  
14 power at fixed prices to Short-Term customers and at fixed prices for Augmentation needs, the  
15 revenues that will be received from Short-Term customers will equal the remarketing credits  
16 paid to Tier 2 customers, and there is no risk to BPA.

17  
18 **4.4 Risks Associated with Resource Support Services Rate Design**

19 **4.4.1 Introduction**

20 Resource Support Services (RSS) are resource-following services that help financially convert  
21 the variable, non-dispatchable output from non-Federal generating resources to a known,  
22 guaranteed shape. Operationally, BPA serves the net load placed on it after taking into  
23 consideration the variability of the customer’s loads and resources.

1 RSS include Secondary Crediting Service (SCS), Diurnal Flattening Service (DFS), and Forced  
2 Outage Reserve Service (FORS). The customers that have elected to purchase RSS and their  
3 elections are listed in the Power Rates Study Documentation, BP-16-E-BPA-01A, Table 3.21.  
4

#### 5 **4.4.2 Identification and Analysis of Risks**

6 The RSS pricing methodology is a value-based methodology that relies on a combination of  
7 forecast market prices and costs associated with new capacity resources rather than aiming to  
8 capture the actual cost of providing these services. Therefore, the primary risk for BPA is that  
9 the “true” value of providing these services will be more or less than the established rate. This  
10 pricing approach makes the sale of RSS no different from that of any other service or product  
11 BPA sells into the open market. Moreover, there is currently no transparent and/or liquid market  
12 for such services, which makes after-the-fact measurements of the “true” value and the price paid  
13 to BPA difficult. Furthermore, BPA does not intend to “color code” its operational decisions.  
14 This means that BPA will not be able to measure the cost of following a customer’s load  
15 separately from the cost of following its resources when a customer is taking some combination  
16 of RSS. Therefore, in addition to the difficulty in quantifying the after-the-fact value difference  
17 between the price paid and the “true” value, it would be extremely challenging, if not impossible,  
18 to measure the difference between the price received by BPA and the cost incurred by BPA.  
19

20 The total forecast cost of RSS is about \$4 million annually. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-16-E-  
21 BPA-01, § 3.1.15.1. The magnitude of the risk of miscalculation of these RSS costs is not large  
22 enough to affect TPP calculations.  
23  
24  
25



1 **4.5 Qualitative Risk Assessment Results**

2 **4.5.1 Biological Opinion Risks**

3 The financial risks deriving from possible changes to Biological Opinions are adequately  
4 mitigated by the NFB mechanisms. *See* section 4.2 above and Power Rate Schedules, BP-16-E-  
5 BPA-09, GRSP II.N.

6  
7 **4.5.2 Risks Associated with Tier 2 Rate Design**

8 Tier 2 risks are adequately mitigated by the terms and conditions of service at the Tier 2 rate and  
9 BPA’s credit risk policies, and no residual Tier 2 risk is borne by BPA or Tier 1.

10  
11 **4.5.3 Risks Associated with Resource Support Services Rate Design**

12 BPA uses a pricing construct that does not lead to prices for RSS that are systematically too high  
13 or systematically too low. There is not a significant financial risk that the cost would affect the  
14 Composite or Non-Slice cost pools or BPA generally, and as a consequence, there is no  
15 quantification or mitigation of RSS risks in this Study.

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## **TABLES AND FIGURES**

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**Table 1: Cash Prices at Henry Hub and Basis Differentials (nominal \$/MMBtu)**

	FY 2016	FY 2017
Henry Hub	\$3.86	\$4.05
AECO	-0.40	-0.42
Kingsgate	-0.16	-0.16
Malin	-0.03	-0.04
Opal	-0.13	-0.15
PG&E	0.31	0.32
Topock/Ehrenberg	0.12	0.13
Socal Citygate	0.24	0.26
San Juan	-0.16	-0.17
Stanfield	-0.10	-0.11
Sumas	-0.09	-0.10

**Table 2: Natural Gas Price Risk Model Percentiles (Nominal Henry Hub)**

FY16	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
95 <sup>th</sup>	5.12	5.27	5.62	5.88	6.02	5.84	5.67	5.43	5.36	5.49	5.58	5.62
50 <sup>th</sup>	3.70	3.77	3.93	4.16	4.12	3.91	3.77	3.71	3.70	3.81	3.82	3.86
5 <sup>th</sup>	2.75	2.75	2.90	3.00	2.94	2.82	2.69	2.66	2.65	2.74	2.77	2.80

FY17	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
95 <sup>th</sup>	5.44	5.55	5.89	6.34	6.56	6.61	6.21	5.98	6.04	6.05	6.02	5.92
50 <sup>th</sup>	3.84	3.90	4.08	4.21	4.20	4.12	3.96	3.89	3.97	4.07	4.05	4.02
5 <sup>th</sup>	2.84	2.89	2.98	3.03	3.10	2.99	2.74	2.73	2.77	2.89	2.87	2.82

**Table 3: Average Market Price from the Market Price Run for FY16/FY17**

<b>FY16</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>
<b>HLH</b>	<b>30.80</b>	<b>32.68</b>	<b>34.44</b>	<b>34.13</b>	<b>33.38</b>	<b>27.80</b>	<b>26.17</b>	<b>22.42</b>	<b>21.81</b>	<b>29.28</b>	<b>32.80</b>	<b>34.38</b>
<b>LLH</b>	<b>26.77</b>	<b>28.24</b>	<b>29.28</b>	<b>27.49</b>	<b>27.96</b>	<b>23.86</b>	<b>22.55</b>	<b>14.62</b>	<b>7.88</b>	<b>22.50</b>	<b>27.16</b>	<b>28.43</b>

<b>FY17</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>
<b>HLH</b>	<b>32.38</b>	<b>34.10</b>	<b>36.17</b>	<b>36.50</b>	<b>36.80</b>	<b>29.62</b>	<b>28.00</b>	<b>25.08</b>	<b>25.62</b>	<b>32.18</b>	<b>35.28</b>	<b>36.10</b>
<b>LLH</b>	<b>27.94</b>	<b>29.50</b>	<b>30.98</b>	<b>31.08</b>	<b>30.60</b>	<b>25.48</b>	<b>24.39</b>	<b>17.24</b>	<b>13.32</b>	<b>24.59</b>	<b>28.72</b>	<b>29.62</b>

**Table 4: Average Market Price from AURORAxmp® Critical Water Run for FY16/FY17**

<b>FY16</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>
<b>HLH</b>	<b>32.33</b>	<b>35.10</b>	<b>37.25</b>	<b>42.21</b>	<b>41.63</b>	<b>32.01</b>	<b>31.32</b>	<b>25.26</b>	<b>26.93</b>	<b>34.77</b>	<b>34.34</b>	<b>35.47</b>
<b>LLH</b>	<b>27.57</b>	<b>30.10</b>	<b>31.96</b>	<b>35.59</b>	<b>34.26</b>	<b>28.31</b>	<b>27.19</b>	<b>22.83</b>	<b>23.51</b>	<b>28.14</b>	<b>27.66</b>	<b>28.75</b>

<b>FY17</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>
<b>HLH</b>	<b>33.94</b>	<b>36.68</b>	<b>38.93</b>	<b>44.24</b>	<b>47.31</b>	<b>34.69</b>	<b>32.81</b>	<b>27.48</b>	<b>29.80</b>	<b>37.99</b>	<b>36.65</b>	<b>37.17</b>
<b>LLH</b>	<b>28.74</b>	<b>31.40</b>	<b>33.07</b>	<b>37.66</b>	<b>37.79</b>	<b>30.48</b>	<b>28.77</b>	<b>23.97</b>	<b>26.05</b>	<b>30.70</b>	<b>29.28</b>	<b>29.88</b>

**Table 5: RevSim Net Revenue Statistics (With PNRR of \$0 million)**

	A	B	C
		FY16	FY17
1			
2	<b>Average</b>	\$ 50,846	\$ (45,772)
3	<b>Median</b>	\$ 48,336	\$ (45,423)
4	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	\$ 170,537	\$ 189,448
5			
6	<b>1%</b>	\$ (246,175)	\$ (379,412)
7	<b>2.50%</b>	\$ (235,678)	\$ (364,223)
8	<b>5%</b>	\$ (225,252)	\$ (353,031)
9	<b>10%</b>	\$ (189,836)	\$ (318,704)
10	<b>15%</b>	\$ (146,032)	\$ (261,413)
11	<b>20%</b>	\$ (109,832)	\$ (221,143)
12	<b>25%</b>	\$ (83,724)	\$ (194,209)
13	<b>30%</b>	\$ (56,453)	\$ (168,152)
14	<b>35%</b>	\$ (25,278)	\$ (132,163)
15	<b>40%</b>	\$ 4,128	\$ (97,278)
16	<b>45%</b>	\$ 26,849	\$ (71,701)
17	<b>50%</b>	\$ 48,336	\$ (45,423)
18	<b>55%</b>	\$ 72,206	\$ (18,386)
19	<b>60%</b>	\$ 99,329	\$ 8,370
20	<b>65%</b>	\$ 124,317	\$ 38,901
21	<b>70%</b>	\$ 147,076	\$ 65,279
22	<b>75%</b>	\$ 176,790	\$ 94,331
23	<b>80%</b>	\$ 206,274	\$ 122,929
24	<b>85%</b>	\$ 241,635	\$ 159,135
25	<b>90%</b>	\$ 278,674	\$ 201,592
26	<b>95%</b>	\$ 328,369	\$ 262,832
27	<b>97.50%</b>	\$ 375,043	\$ 315,095
28	<b>99%</b>	\$ 426,556	\$ 389,565

**Table 6: Risk Modeling Net Revenue To Cash Adjustments (in \$Thousands)**

<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>C</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>E</b>
		<b>FY 2015</b>	<b>FY 2016</b>	<b>FY 2017</b>
<b>1</b>	Depreciation/Capitalization	182,766	166,609	181,212
<b>2</b>	FY14 Libby/NTSA	16,867	-	-
<b>3</b>	Other Misc Adjustments	(4,295)	-	-
<b>4</b>	Debt Principal Repayment	(410,163)	(166,610)	(181,212)
<b>5</b>	FY14 Slice Payment	(40,826)	-	-
<b>6</b>	FY15 Slice Accrual	26,755	(26,755)	-
<b>7</b>	NORM Slice True Up Lagging out of this year	<b>4,077</b>	<b>2,934</b>	<b>810</b>
<b>8</b>	NORM Slice True Up Lagging in from previous year	-	<b>(4,077)</b>	<b>(2,934)</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Net Revenue to Cash Adjustment</b>	<b>(224,819)</b>	<b>(27,899)</b>	<b>(2,124)</b>



**Table 7: CRAC Annual Thresholds and Caps**  
[Dollars in millions]

<b>A</b> <b>ACNR</b> <b>Calculated at</b> <b>End of Fiscal</b> <b>Year</b>	<b>B</b> <b>CRAC</b> <b>Applied</b> <b>to Fiscal</b> <b>Year</b>	<b>C</b> <b>CRAC</b> <b>Threshold as</b> <b>Measured in</b> <b>ACNR</b>	<b>D</b> <b>Approx.</b> <b>Threshold as</b> <b>Measured in</b> <b>PS Reserves</b>	<b>E</b> <b>Maximum</b> <b>CRAC Recovery</b> <b>Amount</b> <b>(CRAC Cap)*</b>
2015	2016	-\$48.3	\$0	\$300
2016	2017	-\$20.2	\$0	\$300

\* The CRAC Cap may be modified by NFB Adjustments

**Table 8: DDC Thresholds and Caps**  
[Dollars in millions]

<b>A</b> <b>ACNR</b> <b>Calculated at</b> <b>End of Fiscal</b> <b>Year</b>	<b>B</b> <b>DDC</b> <b>Applied</b> <b>to Fiscal</b> <b>Year</b>	<b>C</b> <b>DDC</b> <b>Threshold as</b> <b>Measured in</b> <b>ACNR</b>	<b>D</b> <b>Approx.</b> <b>Threshold as</b> <b>Measured in</b> <b>PS Reserves</b>	<b>E</b> <b>Maximum</b> <b>DDC Distribution</b> <b>Amount</b> <b>(DDC Cap)</b>
2015	2016	\$701.7	\$750	\$1,000
2016	2017	\$729.8	\$750	\$1,000

**Table 9: ToolKit Summary Statistics**

[Dollars in Millions]				
	A	B	C	D
<b>1</b>	Two-Year TPP		99.91%	
		<b>FY 2015</b>	<b>FY 2016</b>	<b>FY 2017</b>
<b>2</b>	PNRR	-	\$0.0	\$0.0
<b>3</b>	CRAC Frequency	0%	3%	4%
<b>4</b>	Expected Value CRAC Revenue	\$0.0	\$1.0	\$3.0
<b>5</b>	DDC Frequency	0%	0.5%	8%
<b>6</b>	Expected Value DDC Payout	\$0.0	\$0.1	\$8.4
<b>7</b>	Treasury Deferral Frequency	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
<b>8</b>	Expected Value Treasury Deferral	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.016
<b>9</b>	Exp. Value End-of-Year Net Reserves	\$377.6	\$410.6	\$367.0
<b>10</b>	Net Reserves, 5th percentile	\$107.1	\$15.4	(\$181.0)
<b>11</b>	Net Reserves, 25th percentile	\$264.6	\$243.9	\$121.2
<b>12</b>	Net Reserves, 50th percentile	\$382.2	\$409.2	\$380.1
<b>13</b>	Net Reserves, 75th percentile	\$500.3	\$582.2	\$610.0
<b>14</b>	Net Reserves, 95th percentile	\$635.4	\$806.5	\$887.9

Figure 1: Risk Assessment Information Flow




Figure 2: AURORAxmp® Zonal Topology




Figure 3: Basis Locations




Figure 4: January 2013 through October 2014 Henry Hub Gas prices






Figure 5: U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration


Figure 6: Natural Gas Storage



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration



Figure 7: Natural Gas Domestic Consumption (Demand)



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

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